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THE BROKEN PROMISE OF OBRA ’87: THE FAILURE TO 
VALIDATE THE SURVEY PROTOCOL 
MALCOLM J. HARKINS III* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Nursing facilities are among the most heavily regulated entities in the 
American economy. Unfortunately, nursing facilities also are among the most 
inconsistently and ineffectively regulated entities. 
It is not a secret that government inspections of nursing facilities do not 
result in valid, accurate, and consistent assessments of the quality of care. To 
the contrary, decades of empirical studies and anecdotal evidence make the 
point largely without contradiction. 
Nursing home regulation is the modern-day analog of the fable in which no 
one dares to mention that the emperor has no clothes. Politicians, regulators, 
researchers, advocates for both nursing home residents and industry interests, 
and courts—virtually anyone with an interest in assessment of nursing home 
care—treat the results of the regulatory system as trustworthy—at least in so 
far as such results conform to the speaker’s professional or political interests. 
Numerous studies dating back to the 1990s collectively make four points 
about the unreliability of nursing home inspection results. First, the inspection 
process does not accurately determine whether a nursing facility is in 
compliance with the substantive care standards established by federal 
regulations. Second, the inspection process fails to appropriately and 
accurately assess the seriousness of violations found. Third, inspection results 
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are inconsistent. Fourth, there is no evidence that the inaccuracies and 
variations in survey results are related to differences in quality. 
To be sure, many investigators, especially in recent years, have asserted 
that the regulatory system fails to identify instances of deficient nursing facility 
care. Indeed, the problems of under-citation, as well as under-classification of 
the seriousness of deficient practices, have been studied extensively. In fact, 
the problems of under-citation and under-classification have been the focus of 
studies of the inspection protocol in recent years. Although recognizing that 
the survey process is systemically flawed, there is an implicit assumption in 
such studies that the systemic flaws cause only over-citation and under-
citation. There is no empirical evidence supporting that assumption, however. 
Any viable effort to reform the nursing home regulatory system must start 
by acknowledging that systemic flaws in the survey inspection methodology 
and protocols result in both false-negative and false-positive findings. Such an 
approach is mandated by law as well as common sense. 
The Nursing Home Reform Act mandated that the assessment protocol be 
“developed, tested, and validated by not later than January 1, 1990,” the date 
on which the federal government was required to implement the new 
assessment protocols and procedures.1 Initially, there was no doubt about the 
meaning of “tested and validated.” 
The Department of Health and Human Services’ Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS) acknowledged that Omnibus Budget Reconciliation 
Act of 1987 (OBRA ’87) required that survey results must be both accurate 
and consistent.2 According to CMS, “[a]ccuracy means not only that the 
[survey] team has appropriately cited all deficiencies that existed, but also that 
it has not cited a deficiency when no violation of a requirement has occurred.”3 
“Consistent,” according to CMS, means that survey “results are consistent 
across surveyors, and . . . that the enforcement actions precipitated by the 
survey results are consistently applied.”4 “Inadequate survey performance” is 
defined by regulation as “a pattern of failure to . . . identify deficiencies . . . [or 
to] [c]ite only valid deficiencies.”5 
 
 1. 42 U.S.C. §1395i-3(g)(2)(C) (2012). The prior citation identifies the relevant provision 
of the Medicare Act. The Medicaid Act contains requirements governing the survey and 
certification process that are essentially identical to those in the Medicare Act. The majority of 
those provisions are found at 42 U.S.C. 1396r. Because the language of the Medicare and 
Medicaid provisions is virtually identical, in most instances, this article provides the citation to 
the Medicare Act provisions only. 
 2. Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Survey, Certification, and Enforcement of Skilled 
Nursing Facilities and Nursing Facilities, 59 Fed. Reg. 56,116, 56,140 (Nov. 10, 1994). 
 3. Id. at 56,146-147. 
 4. Id. at 56,141. 
 5. 42 C.F.R. § 488.318(a)(1) (2014). 
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OBRA ’87’s requirements that the survey methodology produce valid, 
accurate, and consistent results was neither sui generis, nor was it a casually 
considered suggestion. To the contrary, the requirement wrote into law one of 
the three key recommendations of the landmark study, “Improving the Quality 
of Care In Nursing Homes,” published by the National Academy of Sciences 
Institute of Medicine (IOM) in 1986.6 
The IOM study was ordered by Congress and commissioned by the 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). The IOM study was 
undertaken after numerous efforts to reform the nursing home regulatory 
system had failed, despite widespread consensus that the existing regulatory 
system neither measured nor promoted quality of care.7 IOM was viewed as a 
“fair broker” that possessed the expertise and credibility to reconcile the 
competing interests and recommend a fair and balanced regulatory system.8 
IOM made specific and pervasive recommendations for legislative changes 
to the nursing home regulatory process. IOM compared the three components 
of the regulatory process to the legs of a three-legged stool: “All are equally 
important.”9 The three legs of the regulatory stool are: (1) the substantive care 
standards; (2) the inspection methodology and procedures (or “survey”) used 
to assess compliance with such standards; and, (3) the means of enforcing 
compliance.10 
IOM emphasized that the regulatory process could not be effective unless 
the second leg—the methodologies and procedures utilized to assess 
compliance with quality standards—was a reliable, valid, consistent, and 
accurate means of assessing quality. The Report specified that the survey 
protocol should be validated by “the findings of careful empirical studies,” and 
that tests of the survey protocol should be “carefully analyzed for interrater 
reliability in use of the instrument” because “[s]urvey findings must be valid 
and reliable as well as consistent—they should be capable of determining the 
extent to which a facility is in compliance with [Medicare and Medicaid 
participation requirements].”11 The IOM Report similarly insisted that “[i]t is 
essential to incorporate statistically defensible sampling procedures to achieve 
 
 6. All three of IOM’s recommendations were written into law by OBRA’87. The other two 
recommendations addressed implementation of resident-focused substantive care standards and 
improving the effectiveness of enforcement actions taken in response to findings of deficient care. 
See, e.g., COMM. ON NURSING HOME REGULATION, INST. OF MED., IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF 
CARE IN NURSING HOMES 70, 71 (1986) [hereinafter IOM REPORT]. 
 7. See, e.g., id. at 1-2, 12-16, 238-53. 
 8. Thomas G. Morford, Nursing Home Regulation: History and Expectations, 1988 
(SUPPL.) HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV. 129, 130 (1988) [hereinafter Morford]. 
 9. IOM REPORT, supra note 6, at 69. 
 10. Id. at 69. 
 11. Id. at 76, 128, 131. 
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valid, consistent, and reliable findings.”12 Further, according to IOM, failure to 
base survey findings on review of a “statistically, valid case-mix-stratified 
sample of residents” means that a nursing facility with very few residents at 
high risk of problems and complications will incorrectly appear to have better 
outcomes than a facility with a more debilitated population.13 OBRA ’87 
adopted wholesale IOM’s recommendations.14 
This article, beginning in the 1970s, reviews decades of studies of the 
validity and accuracy of nursing home regulation. Using primarily studies and 
reports prepared by, or at the behest of, the federal government, this article 
demonstrates that every study of the system used by the federal government to 
assess nursing home care has shown nursing home quality assessment is 
inconsistent, inaccurate, and unreliable. Yet, government regulators, industry 
officials, resident advocates, courts, and public policy researchers persist in 
relying on survey data—and encourage others to do so as well—to pursue 
enforcement actions, to draw conclusions about the relative and absolute 
quality of nursing facilities, to make conclusions about the state of nursing 
facility care generally, and to recommend public health policy initiatives 
regarding nursing facility care delivery. 
In the usual case, the ability of regulators and others to utilize data of 
questionable validity would be subject to judicial review. As a general rule, 
courts would not permit the use of data or opinion testimony without some 
showing that the data and the opinions based on them are valid and reliable.15 
 
 12. Id. at 131. 
 13. Id. at 114, 115-17. 
 14. 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(g)(2)(C) (2012). The meaning of “valid” is also well understood 
outside of the context of OBRA ’87. There is a body of case law interpreting “valid” to mean 
capable of producing accurate and reliable results. The Supreme Court, for example, has held that 
district courts must, and such courts routinely do, determine the scientific validity of expert 
testimony as a precondition to admitting such testimony into evidence. See, e.g., Daubert v. 
Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579, 590 n.9 (1993) (“We note that scientists typically 
distinguish between “validity” (does the principle support what it purports to show?) and 
“reliability” (does application of the principle produce consistent results?)”); see also Pride v. 
BIC Corp., 218 F.3d 566, 577 (6th Cir. 2000) (“Proposed testimony must be supported by 
appropriate validation - i.e., “good grounds,” based on what is known) (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. 
at 590); see also Berry v. Crown Equip. Corp., 108 F. Supp. 2d 743, 749 (E.D. Mich. 2000) 
(same); see also Thompson v. Frostproof, 103 So. 118, 118 (Fla. 1925) (“Validate, validation and 
validating are all derivatives of valid, which is defined in the Century Dictionary as meaning to 
test the validity of, to make valid, confirm, good or sufficient in point of law, efficacious, 
executed with the proper formalities, incapable of being rightfully overthrown or set aside, 
sustainable and effective in law as distinguished from that which exists or took place [sic] in fact 
or appearance but has not the requisites to enable it to be recognized and enforced by law.”). By 
using the term “validate,” Congress used a term that courts are familiar with and routinely apply 
to determine whether evidence has sufficient indicia of accuracy and that it is reliable enough to 
be relied on or considered in determining the rights of litigants. 
 15. See supra note 14. 
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Nursing home regulation is not the usual case, however. A series of 
jurisdictional, procedural, economic, and practical barriers insulate the survey 
protocol from meaningful challenge and judicial oversight; OBRA ’87’s 
commands to test and validate the survey protocol and to measure and reduce 
inconsistency are thereby rendered largely meaningless.16 
 
 16. First, despite OBRA’87 requirement that routine annual (known as “standard”) surveys 
must be conducted using the specified protocol, 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(g)(2)(C); see also 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1395i-3(g)(3)(A) (requiring federal surveyors conducting validation surveys to assess the 
performance of state surveyors to utilize the same protocol), the surveyors’ failure to utilize the 
prescribed survey protocol is irrelevant when challenging survey decisions. See 42 C.F.R. § 
488.305(b) (2014) (“The State survey agency’s failure to follow the procedures set forth in this 
section will not invalidate otherwise legitimate determinations that a facility’s deficiencies 
exist.”); see also 42 C.F.R. § 488.318(a)-(b) (2014) (“Inadequate survey performance,” including 
the failure,” [u]se Federal standards, protocols and the forms to, methods and procedures 
specified by CMS. . .” and the failure to “[c]onduct surveys in accordance with the requirements 
of this subpart” does not “invalidate adequately documented deficiencies.”). 
  Federal court review is also not realistic. The Medicare Act denies federal courts 
jurisdiction to review challenges to the survey and enforcement system until after complete 
exhaustion of administrative remedies. Exhaustion of such remedies is costly and often takes a 
year or more to complete, effectively rendering any remedy meaningless. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) 
(2012), made applicable to the Medicare Act by 42 U.S.C. § 1395ii (2012) and to appeals by 
nursing facilities by 42 U.S.C. 1395cc(h)(1) (2012). See also Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long 
Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1, 12-13 (2000); id. at 48 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Peak Med. Okla. 
No. 5 d/b/a Woodland View Care & Rehab. Ctr. v. Sebelius, 2010 WL 4809319, at *4 (N.D. 
Okla. Nov. 5, 2010). 
  Third, a nursing facility may appeal an adverse finding only when a “remedy,” i.e, a 
sanction, is imposed by CMS. If the provider corrects the alleged problem in order to avoid 
sanction and assure uninterrupted Medicare and Medicaid payments, the right to appeal is lost. 
Thus, a provider wishing to appeal must maintain its innocence and accept substantial economic 
risk to mount a challenge the protocol – a challenge that a court will not hear and adjudicate for 
years. See e.g., Bryn Mawr Care Inc., v. Sebelius, 749 F.3d 592, 603 (7th Cir. 2014). 
  Finally, the procedural rules and rules of decision utilized in administrative appeals 
effectively “stack the deck” in CMS’s favor. See generally Joseph L. Bianculli and Kelly A. 
Priegnitz, Presentation at American Health Lawyers Association, Long Term Care and the Law 
Conference: 2012 Survey and Enforcement Case Law Update (Feb. 2012), available at 
https://www.healthlawyers.org/Events/Programs/Materials/Documents/LTC12/papers/N_biancull
i_priegnitz.pdf. Such rules make the chances of a nursing facility prevailing minimal and the 
investment in doing so, at least, questionable. Id. at 3-4. (“During 2010 and 2011, the Board 
issued about 50 decisions on the merits in nursing facility appeals (that is, not including decisions 
on procedural issues such as timeliness and the like). During this two year period, the Board 
decided exactly zero of these appeals in favor of facilities on the merits. In contrast to past years, 
the Board did not reverse a single ALJ Decision against a facility. During this same time period, 
ALJs rendered about 100 decisions on the merits. Of these, about five set aside all cited 
deficiencies, and another half dozen set aside most deficiencies, and/or most of the sanctions 
CMS imposed. CMS did not appeal every such decision, but in those that CMS did appeal to the 
Board, the Board reversed (or remanded for reconsideration) every such favorable decision. 
Contrast this track record to past years, where facilities routinely “won” about a quarter of all 
cases decided on the merits.” (footnotes omitted) Moreover, even when a provider successfully 
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Consequently, effective enforcement of IOM’s “prime directive” and 
OBRA ’87’s mandate that nursing facility care be assessed using a 
methodology that produces valid and accurate results is not possible as a 
practical matter. The inability to challenge the validity and accuracy of the 
survey protocol also means that government regulators are largely 
unaccountable for failing to correct survey systems flaws. 
There is, therefore, little incentive—and virtually no compulsion—for 
regulators to assure that surveys produce valid, reliable, consistent, and 
accurate findings of both compliance and noncompliance. To the contrary, by 
continually focusing on under-citation, such individuals advance the politically 
and professionally desirable goals of enhancing their image and that of the 
enforcement agencies as regulators who are tough on noncompliance and 
committed to ferreting out problems. Accurate policing has a limited and less 
compelling constituency. Thus, declines in deficiency rates and severity are 
dismissed—based on speculation and without empirical evidence—as 
attributable to unknown factors and not indicative of care improvements.17 
Relying on deeply flawed data—and encouraging others to do so—without 
acknowledging the flaws is a betrayal of the public trust. Most importantly, it 
deceives those whose health, safety, and welfare depends upon the credibility 
and effectiveness of the nursing facility survey process. It also sends a message 
to the regulated and to the first level regulators that the survey process is 
“effective,” whether or not it is accurate, because it serves the narrow political 
interests of regulators and others who rely on the data despite knowledge that 
the survey is not an accurate or consistent performance measurement tool. 
Finally, after almost thirty years, it has institutionalized a survey system that is 
arbitrary, inconsistent, ineffective, and does not promote quality. That result, it 
seems, is more palatable, administratively and politically, than admitting that 
the survey process has never been tested and validated as OBRA ’87 required 
and, consequently, that the government has no effective means of 
distinguishing quality care from deficient care. 
II.  THE NURSING HOME SURVEY SYSTEM: HISTORY AND BACKGROUND 
In order to be eligible for payment by the Medicare and Medicaid 
programs, a nursing facility must be certified as in compliance with federal and 
 
disputes a deficiency citation, the government cannot be compelled to correct its records or 
precluded from public disclosures alleging that the facility violated care standards. See, e.g., Bryn 
Mawr Care Inc., 749 F.3d at 603. Consequently, at least one level, victory is pyrrhic. 
 17. Compare Statement of Leslie v. Norwalk, Acting Admin. CMS, Taking Quality Nursing 
Home Care to the Next Level (Apr. 19, 2007), available at https://www.nhqvalitycampaign.org/ 
files/NHQC0407_LOS_CMSnorwalk.pdf (discussing extensive, voluntary care improvement 
programs instituted by nursing home industry). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2014] THE BROKEN PROMISE OF OBRA ’87 95 
state quality standards.18 The federal quality standards are embodied in a 
detailed set of substantive care standards contained in federal regulations.19 
A nursing facility obtains certification that it is in compliance with federal 
quality standards by submitting to an inspection, called a survey, performed by 
state inspectors.20 These inspectors, known as “surveyors,” are generally the 
same individuals who perform inspections to determine a nursing facility’s 
compliance with state licensure laws. 
The work of the state inspectors is subject to periodic oversight and review 
by federal officials.21 Federal review and oversight may take a variety of forms 
ranging from desk review of the state surveyors’ findings, on-site surveys by 
federal inspectors shortly after the state inspection, “looking behind” the state 
results and comparative federal surveys.22 Importantly, whether a survey is 
conducted by state surveyors or by federal surveyors, the Medicare and 
Medicaid Acts require that all surveys must be conducted using the same 
quality assessment protocols and methodologies required pursuant to OBRA 
’87.23 
In the first twenty-five years after passage of the Medicaid Act, consensus 
developed among all concerned that the initial quality standards governing 
nursing facility care delivery and the enforcement of those standards did not 
result in the quality of care expected.24 A number of reasons were given to 
explain why the quality desired was not the quality delivered. 
First, it was widely believed that the quality standards assessed the wrong 
things. The initial substantive care standards in the regulations were primarily 
structural; that is, the regulations primarily focused upon such things as the 
organization of the nursing facility,25 the resources available,26 and 
qualifications of the staff.27 The assumption implicit in those initial regulations 
was that if the right resources were in place, good results and care outcomes 
would follow because those responsible for care delivery would do the right 
thing.28 
 
 18. 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(g)(3); 42 C.F.R. § 488.330 (2014). 
 19. 42 C.F.R. §§ 483.1-75 (2014). 
 20. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(g)(1)(A); 42 C.F.R. §§ 488.10(a), 488.11(a), 488.12 (2014) 
 21. 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(g)(3)(A). 
 22. IOM REPORT, supra note 6, at 37-38. 
 23. 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(g)(2)(C); 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(g)(3)(A). 
 24. IOM REPORT, supra note 6, at 12-16, 238-248 (discussing the history of nursing home 
regulation); see also Morford, supra note 8, at 131; Gary S. Winzelberg, The Quest for Nursing 
Home Quality: Learning History’s Lessons, 163 ARCH. INT. MED. 2552, 2552 (2003); Patricia A 
Butler, Assuring the Quality of Care in Nursing Homes, 57 N.C. L. REV. 1317, 1336-37 (1979). 
 25. IOM REPORT, supra note 6, at 53. 
 26. Id. at 296. 
 27. Id. at 76. 
 28. Id. at 54. 
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Second, it also was widely believed that quality problems were the result, 
at least in part, of weaknesses in the inspection process. For example, every 
state had its own approach to conducting inspections.29 Some states allowed 
individual surveyors to utilize ad hoc approaches; other states required a more 
structured approach. Some states required assessment of a sample of nursing 
facility residents; others required that the care of every resident be assessed by 
the inspectors. 
The federal government itself required two different surveys. One survey 
was done for certification purposes to determine whether the facility was in 
compliance with Medicare and/or Medicaid requirements, and, therefore, 
eligible for payment for services rendered to beneficiaries of those programs.30 
The second survey, known as the inspection of care (IOC) survey, was done to 
determine whether a nursing facility’s Medicaid residents were receiving 
adequate care.31 The IOC survey determined whether the state was entitled to 
payment of federal matching funds for the care of each Medicaid resident.32 
The two surveys were generally done in conjunction with one another but 
using different quality assessment methods.33 The certification survey assessed 
the care rendered to the facility’s residents generally, i.e., in the aggregate. 
There was no requirement that each resident’s care be individually assessed. 
The IOC survey was conducted independently of the certification survey, but 
often by the same state surveyors who had conducted the certification survey. 
IOC surveyors, however, were required to conduct an individualized 
assessment of the condition, needs, and adequacy of the care provided based 
on record review and observation of each Medicaid resident.34 
In addition to not requiring that the certification survey be conducted using 
a uniform methodology, the substantive care criteria applied to evaluate a 
nursing facility were vague. Consequently, the surveyors also had broad 
discretion to determine the meaning and application of the regulations in 
individual circumstances. Such discretion, it was widely believed, introduced 
an unacceptable level of subjectivity and inconsistency into the survey 
process.35 
Third, even when it was generally agreed that the process had identified 
quality deficiencies, enforcement was inconsistent. Initially, termination of a 
facility’s Medicare or Medicaid participation was the only remedy for quality 
 
 29. Id. at 35. 
 30. IOM REPORT, supra note 6, at 69. 
 31. Id. at 140. 
 32. Id. at 319. 
 33. Id. at 140. 
 34. See, e.g., id. at 71. 
 35. IOM REPORT, supra note 6, at 108, 140-42 (describing IOC survey). 
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deficiencies.36 Termination, however, was rarely used because: (1) the nursing 
facility’s residents would bear the brunt of the sanction when they were 
forcibly relocated; and (2) there were insufficient numbers of nursing facilities 
to meet the demand for nursing facility services.37 In short, the passage of the 
Medicare and Medicaid Act had created a benefit and guaranteed payment for 
delivery of such services, but there were insufficient nursing home beds 
available to satisfy the demand for services. This meant that regulators were 
extremely reluctant to aggressively enforce quality standards because closure 
of a nursing facility might leave its residents with nowhere to go.38 As a result, 
surveyors were viewed as consultants whose job was to encourage and assist 
delinquent nursing facilities to come into compliance with federal quality 
standards.39 
The impact of the systemic flaws in the regulatory system was confirmed 
by, among others, a 1971 General Accounting Office (GAO) Report titled 
“Problems in Providing Proper Care to Medicare and Medicaid Patients in 
Skilled Nursing Homes.”40 The Report found “many nursing homes 
participating in the Medicaid program—and in some cases, the Medicare 
program—were not adhering to Federal requirements for participation.”41 
According to GAO, “[t]he nonadherence to requirements resulted primarily 
from weaknesses in State procedures for certifying eligibility of homes and 
from ineffective State and HEW enforcement of Federal requirements.” 42 
In the mid-1980s, the regulatory environment began to change 
dramatically. The consultative approach was displaced in favor of a more 
aggressive, enforcement-orientated approach. A number of factors contributed 
to this change: (1) litigation challenging the effectiveness of the inspection 
process and, specifically, whether that process actually assessed the quality of 
care provided; (2) a series of notorious reports of inadequate and poor quality 
care in long-term care facilities; (3) shifting in the care needs of the typical 
long-term care resident from custodial care to more complex, professional, and 
 
 36. See id. at 13, 154. 
 37. Id. at 13. 
 38. Id. at 240-41. The problem was two-fold. First, sufficient numbers of facilities and beds 
to meet demand did not exist or were not located appropriately to serve the population in need. In 
addition those facilities that did exist, relatively few met the certification standards. In the first 
year, after adoption of the Medicare program, 6,000 facilities applied for certification but only 
740 qualified; another 3,000 facilities were certified as in substantial compliance. Id. 
 39. Id. at 150. 
 40. U.S. GOV’T GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, B-164031(3), PROBLEMS IN PROVIDING 
PROPER CARE TO MEDICAID AND MEDICARE PATIENTS IN SKILLED NURSING HOMES 2 (May 28, 
1971). 
 41. Id. at 2. 
 42. Id. at 9. This GAO report found that more than one-half of the nursing facilities audited 
in three states were in violation of federal certification standards pertaining to nurse staffing, 
physician visits and fire safety. Id. at 2-3. 
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post-acute care; (4) sharply escalating federal and state payments for long-term 
care coupled with uncertainty regarding whether such payments actually 
supported quality of care; and, (5) the maturing of the nursing facility industry 
such that sufficient beds generally were available to meet the demand for 
nursing facility services. 
In Colorado, for example, a group of nursing facility residents sued both 
the federal and state governments claiming that the inspection methodology 
used to determine compliance with substantive care standards was 
ineffective.43 The plaintiffs contended that the survey tools inappropriately 
assessed only a facility’s capability of delivering care, not actual patient 
outcomes or the effectiveness of such care. As a result, the plaintiffs argued, 
the government had no idea whether Medicaid payments to long-term care 
facilities were buying quality care. 
In 1984, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit agreed. 
The court held: 
The Secretary has a duty to promulgate regulations which will enable her to be 
informed as to whether the nursing facilities receiving federal Medicaid funds 
are actually providing high quality medical care . . . . [T]he Secretary has failed 
to discharge her statutory duty altogether.44 
On remand, the District Court ordered the Secretary of HHS45 to develop a 
survey protocol that was prescriptive, that was embodied in regulations and 
that assessed quality based on actual resident outcome, rather than based on 
whether a facility’s care process and structure indicated that it was capable of 
delivering quality of care.46 
At about the same time, after several failed attempts to revise the survey, 
certification, and enforcement processes administratively,47 Congress ordered 
HHS to contract with the IOM to study the existing regulatory system and to 
make recommendations for improvements. In 1986, the IOM returned its 
landmark report, “Improving the Quality of Care in Nursing Homes.”48 
After discussing the current state of nursing facility regulation, the IOM 
made a fundamental point: 
 
 43. Estate of Smith v. Heckler, 747 F.2d. 583, 585 (10th Cir. 1984). 
 44. Id. at 591. 
 45. At the time the agency was known as the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 
(HEW). Similarly, at the same time, the component of HEW responsible for administration of the 
survey process was the Health Care Financing Administration. The name changes have no 
practical significance for present purposes. Therefore, throughout this article the entities’ current 
names are used – the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). 
 46. Id. at 591-92. 
 47. IOM REPORT, supra note 6, at 1. 
 48. See generally id. 
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Government regulation of nursing homes for quality assurance purposes has 
three components: (1) the criteria used to determine whether a nursing home is 
providing care of acceptable quality . . . (2) the procedures used to determine 
the extent to which nursing homes comply with the criteria, and (3) the 
procedures used to enforce compliance. The three components are the like the 
legs of a three-legged stool: All are equally important.49 
IOM emphasized that the “development and use of valid and reliable 
instruments to measure quality are critically important to quality assurance and 
to regulation.”50 According to IOM, the survey protocol should be validated by 
“[t]he findings of careful empirical studies,” and the survey protocol should be 
“carefully analyzed for interrater reliability in the use of the instrument [].” 
Such testing was necessary because “[s]urvey findings must be valid and 
reliable as well as consistent . . . .”51 “[S]tatistically defensible . . . procedures,” 
IOM reiterated, were “essential . . . to achieve valid,52 consistent and reliable 
findings.” According to IOM, this meant that “[a]ll survey protocols 
(instruments and procedures) should be tested so that when used by properly 
trained surveyors they produce consistent and reliable findings.”53 
In 1987, Congress adopted virtually all of IOM’s recommendations, 
essentially without modification, in OBRA ’87.54 Among the many significant 
and far-reaching changes made by OBRA ’87, three are important here. 
First, the statute shifted the focus of the inspection process away from its 
prior concern with process and structural requirements. Rather than asking 
whether a facility was organized in a way that made the facility capable of 
providing quality of care, OBRA ’87 required that quality be determined by 
focusing primarily on the actual outcomes of resident care.55 In short, 
following OBRA ’87, surveyors were no longer to assess what a long-term 
care facility could do; surveyors were to determine whether the facility 
residents actually received care to meet their needs based on whether those 
residents achieved or maintained appropriate care outcomes.56 
Second, the statute contemplated that regulators would aggressively 
enforce compliance with quality standards. To that end, OBRA ’87 provided 
enforcement tools, including a variety of intermediate sanctions, including 
Civil Money Penalties, temporary management, and denial of payment in 
 
 49. Id. at 69. 
 50. Id. at 56. 
 51. Id. at 128. 
 52. Id. 
 53. IOM REPORT, supra note 6, at 128. 
 54. Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330-1339 (Dec. 
22, 1987). 
 55. See, e.g., Morford, supra note 8, at 131 (“The basic change overriding all others is . . . 
emphasis on patient outcomes”). 
 56. 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(b)(2) (2012). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
100 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY [Vol. 8:89 
certain circumstances, short of termination of a nursing facility’s participation 
in Medicare and Medicaid programs.57 
The new enforcement process was intended to limit the time between 
discovery of a violation of care standards and imposition of a remedy as a 
means of encouraging compliance. Moreover, the menu of intermediate 
sanctions, i.e., other than termination of program participation, was intended to 
punish the facility without directly burdening the residents as had previously 
been the case when program termination was the only option for 
noncompliance. As a result, it was expected that remedies would be utilized 
without hesitation. 
Finally, OBRA ’87 also included an express requirement that the survey 
protocol utilized to assess the quality of nursing facility care be tested and 
validated prior to the date the statute required that the new approach be 
implemented, January 1, 1990.58 Further, the federal Secretary and the states 
were mandated to implement ongoing programs to assure that survey results 
were consistent.59 The statute provided: 
(C) SURVEY PROTOCOL. Standard and extended surveys shall be 
conducted — 
(i) based upon a protocol which the Secretary has developed, tested and 
validated by not later than January 1, 1990, and . . . 
(D) CONSISTENCY OF SURVEYS. Each State and the Secretary shall 
implement programs to measure and reduce inconsistency in the application of 
survey results among surveyors.60 
The statute also provided that the failure to develop, test, and validate the 
survey protocol did not relieve a state or the Secretary of the responsibility to 
survey nursing facilities.61 Although nursing facility surveys would continue to 
be conducted primarily by state inspectors, the statute required oversight by the 
Secretary. Among other things, the statute required that federal surveyors 
conduct follow-up, or validation surveys, shortly after the state inspections in 
order to determine if the state survey results were accurate and valid.62 The 
survey methodology utilized to assess nursing facility quality was considered 
sufficiently important that Congress required the federal oversight surveys to 
be conducted using the same, “tested and validated” methodology that the state 
surveyors were required to utilize. Specifically, OBRA ’87 provided: 
 
 57. 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(h)(1)-(2). 
 58. 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(g)(2)(C). 
 59. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(g)(2)(D). 
 60. 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(g)(2)(C)(i)-(D). 
 61. 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(g)(2)(C). 
 62. 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(g)(3)(A). 
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(3) Validation Surveys. 
(A) The Secretary shall conduct onsite surveys of a representative sample 
of skilled nursing facilities in each State . . . . In conducting such surveys, 
the Secretary shall use the same survey protocols as the state is required to 
use . . . .63 
The statute requires that the Secretary conduct such surveys in a minimum of 
five percent, but not less than five, nursing facilities in each state.64 
III.  THE MANDATE TO “TEST AND VALIDATE:” THIRTY YEARS OF 
GOVERNMENT STUDIES OF THE ACCURACY, VALIDITY, AND CONSISTENCY OF 
SURVEY RESULTS 
The Secretary failed to adhere to the OBRA ’87 mandate with respect to 
the development and implementation of the new survey protocol almost from 
the beginning. Although OBRA ’87 required that the survey protocol be tested 
and validated “not later than January 1, 1990,” i.e., before the new rules were 
effective,65 the Secretary did not contract to test the survey protocol until 
September 1991, nine months after the testing and validation was supposed to 
have been completed.66 Moreover, the contract provided that the testing of the 
survey protocol would not be completed for two years thereafter or, stated 
differently, the testing would not be completed for three years after the 
statutory deadline.67 
In fact, however, the testing was not completed within the expected two 
years after the contract was let. Instead, in 1993, only the preliminary results 
 
 63. Id. 
 64. 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(g)(3)(B). 
 65. 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(g)(2)(C). 
 66. ABT ASSOCIATES, INC., EVALUATION OF THE LONG TERM CARE SURVEY PROCESS, 
FINAL REPORT at i (1996) (hereinafter FINAL REPORT). 
 67. In 2002 the United States District Court for the District of Columbia held that the 
Secretary had no obligation to validate the survey protocol prior to January 1, 1990. Instead, the 
court held that the statute “implie[d] an ongoing process that will result in changes and 
refinements.” To be sure, OBRA’87 mandates an on-going process to assure that survey results 
are accurate and consistent. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(g)(2)(D). That requirement, however, is 
distinct from the mandate to “test and validate” the survey protocol prior to the January 1, 1990 
implementation date. The Court also ignores that Congress, by requiring validation of the 
protocol by a specific date and prior to implementation did not contemplate an open-ended never-
ending process that continues to this day. IOM’s recommendation and OBRA’87 were intended 
to eliminate the validity, reliability and consistency problems that previously characterized survey 
findings. OBRA’87 required a result, not a process. 
  In the interest of full disclosure, the author of this article was counsel to the plaintiff in 
Beverly Health and Rehabilitative Services, Inc. v. Thompson, 223 F.Supp.2d 73 (D.D.C. 2002). 
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were available.68 Those preliminary results found that the protocol did not 
produce valid results: 
Despite implementation of the minimum data system (MDS) [tool for 
assessing nursing home residents’ needs] and attempts to train surveyors in 
how to evaluate outcomes through the interpretive guidelines, the current 
survey does not lead to valid assessments of outcome.69 
In short, the preliminary results found that the new survey protocol failed to 
satisfy one of the basic requirements of OBRA ’87, that the survey protocol 
produce valid results. 
In 1996—six years after the statutory deadline for testing and validating 
the survey protocol—the Final Report largely came to the same conclusions. 
Among other things, the Final Report concluded “that the exercise of surveyor 
discretion can lead to harmful facility practices not being cited, or practices 
being inappropriately cited, in both quality of care and quality of life 
domains.”70 Further, the Abt Report concluded, “the structure of the survey, 
the instruments employed, the training of surveyors, and the inclinations of 
many surveyors, do not readily result in the resident-centered, outcome-
oriented process that the IOM envisioned.”71 According to the Final Report, 
“[t]o make judgments about outcomes, surveyors must rely heavily on their 
professional training and experience and on the brief training provided to them 
about the survey process.72 Abt also found that: 
For all the emphasis that surveyors place on ‘nursing knowledge,’ that 
knowledge in itself does not provide an adequate basis for many nurse-
surveyors to properly make decisions about outcomes.73 
As a result, Abt found that deficiency citations were often inaccurate both 
because actual problems were not cited and because citations were issued when 
not warranted. 
 More specifically, Abt studied in depth nine key outcomes corresponding 
to the most prevalent quality issues in nursing facilities. The Final Report 
found false negative citations (i.e., under-citation) of quality problems in all of 
the domains from thirty-nine to seventy-eight percent of the time and found 
false positive citations (i.e., over-citation) in five of the domains from sixteen 
to twenty-eight percent of the time. 74 For example, Abt concluded that twenty-
 
 68. See generally ABT ASSOCS., INC., BRIEFING POINTS ON THE PRELIMINARY EVALUATION 
RESULTS, EVALUATION OF THE NURSING HOME CERTIFICATION PROCESS (1993) [hereinafter 
BRIEFING POINTS]. 
 69. Id. at 3. 
 70. FINAL REPORT, supra note 66, at 1. 
 71. Id. at 1-2. 
 72. Id. at 72. 
 73. Id. at 96. 
 74. Id. 
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three percent of citations for failure to improve function and twenty-eight 
percent of citations for pressure sore prevention and treatment were false 
positives.75 On the other hand,76 surveyors did not cite care problems related to 
failures to improve function in seventy-eight percent of the cases and in sixty 
percent of the cases with respect to failure to maintain acceptable nutrition 
parameters.77 Overall, the percentage of false negative citations ranged from 
thirty-nine percent to seventy-eight percent (average: sixty-one percent). The 
percentage of false positive citations ranged from twenty-eight percent to five 
percent (average: fifteen percent). Thus, in the aggregate, Abt found that, for 
nine care domains studied, survey findings, on average, were inaccurate 
seventy-six percent of the time. 
The problem, however, was not just that the survey findings were 
inaccurate. In addition, the Abt Final Report also found that survey findings 
and enforcement were not consistent. Abt reported “considerable” fluctuation 
in the rate at which deficiencies are cited and in the level and type of 
enforcement actions from region to region and state to state.78 For example, in 
CMS’ Region 9, an average of 13.09 deficiencies were cited per facility, 
whereas in Region 2, an average of 4.76 deficiencies were cited.79 Abt found 
that it was “difficult for individuals to exercise professional judgment 
consistently” due to the lack of instructions for selecting resident samples and 
 
 75. FINAL REPORT, supra note 66, at 96. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 104. These survey findings examined in detail “correspond to many of the most 
prevalent quality of care issues in nuring homes and to [the areas] frequently emphasized in 
quality of care research[.]” Id. at 104. The false negative and false positive citation rates for each 
area are as follows. 
 False False 
Area Negative Positive 
Maintenance of Function 56% 16% 
Personal Care 50% 9% 
Improvement of Function 78% 23% 
Incontinent Care 39% 6% 
Pressure Sore Prevention 
 and Treatment 64% 28% 
Restraint Usage 56% 16% 
Maintenance of Appropriate 
 Nutritional Status 60% 20% 
Neuroleptic Usage 67% 5% 
Benzodiazepine Usage 75% 8% 
Id. at 123. 
 78. Id. at 29, 33-34. 
 79. Id. at 31. 
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making determinations such as what constitutes a deficiency and whether a 
particular outcome was avoidable.80 
Over the course of the next several years, the conclusions of the Final 
Report were corroborated by other government-sponsored studies. For 
example, in 1998, a congressionally mandated study81 conducted jointly by 
CMS82 and Abt Associates found: 
[T]he new enforcement regulation does not appear to be working as intended 
. . . .[T]here is considerable variation among States in the degree of 
enforcement, as measured by rates of deficiency or substandard quality of care 
determination, [but] it is difficult to separate what proportion of the variation is 
due to true differences in nursing home quality and what proportion is 
attributable to differences in surveyor behavior.83 
It bears emphasis: The evidence supporting the conclusion that the survey 
protocol was ‘not working’ consisted exclusively of data that fewer, and less 
serious, deficiencies were being cited and that substantial variation existed in 
citation rates in different states. 
CMS’s method of testing the validity of the survey process marks a 
significant and unexplained departure from the analysis previously used to 
determine the validity and reliability of survey results. The original Abt 
assessment of the survey protocol—consistent with CMS’s regulations—
assessed the survey’s validity based on: (1) whether the survey cited those 
problems which actually existed; and (2) whether no citations were issued 
when no requirement had been violated.84 The 1998 Report, however, does not 
 
 80. FINAL REPORT, supra note 66, at ii, 45, 56, 67, 72. 
 81. Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-134, § 
516(d), 110 Stat. 1321-248 (1996). 
 82. HEALTH CARE FIN. ADMIN. & ABT ASSOCS., INC., REPORT TO CONGRESS: STUDY OF 
PRIVATE ACCREDITATION (DEEMING) OF NURSING HOMES, REGULATORY INCENTIVES AND 
NON-REGULATORY INITIATIVES, AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE SURVEY AND CERTIFICATION 
SYSTEM 1 (1998) [hereinafter CMS REPORT]. The portion of the Report addressing the 
effectiveness of the survey process was written by the Health Care Financing Administration, as 
CMS formerly was known, not by the outside contractor, Abt Associates Inc. As a convenience, 
the text refers to CMS as the author. This portion of the Report appears to rest primarily on 
analysis of others’ research, and on data analysis rather than original field work. 
 83. Id. at 40. 
 84. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 66, at 122. CMS regulations specify a similar definition 
that tested the accuracy of survey results based on whether (1) appropriate deficiencies were 
cited; and (2) inappropriate citations were not issued. See, e.g., Medicare & Medicaid Programs; 
Survey, Certification and Enforcement of Skilled Nursing Facilities and Nursing Facilities, 59 
Fed. Reg. 56,146-47 (Nov. 10, 1994). 
  Likewise, the original assessment of the validity of the OBRA survey emphasized that 
the integrity of the regulatory system would be undermined by both under and over citation: 
In an effort to ensure standardization, HCFA devised a series of interpretive guidelines 
and accompanying probes for surveyors to use in applying Federal standards. The 
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analyze the results of the survey system from those two perspectives. Rather, 
CMS asks only whether sufficient citations—as defined by agency 
expectations—have been issued. 
Because the number and severity of citations fell short of CMS’s 
expectations, the survey results were deemed invalid.85 There is no 
 
interpretive guidelines are designed to provide the surveyors with a uniform set of 
indicators against which they can measure facility performance. The intent is to ensure 
consistent application of the regulatory requirements by surveyors across the country and 
to minimize, as much as possible, the influence of any individual’s subjective judgment. If 
different surveyor teams were to introduce different criteria or thresholds to the survey 
process, the reliability of that process would be threatened. If a survey team were to write 
fewer – or more – negative findings and deficiencies as a result of its divergence from the 
mandated process, that too would undermine the regulatory system. Hence, assessing the 
consistency with which surveyors employ the survey process and the interpretive 
guidelines is an important objective of the current evaluation. 
FINAL REPORT, supra note 66, at 42. 
 85. For example, the 1998 Report noted the agency’s prediction that definitional changes 
made in 1995 would result in “a substantial increase in deficiencies.” CMS REPORT, supra note 
81, at 39-41. In fact, however, the mean number of citations per facility had continued to drop 
steadily. Id. at 538. For example, in surveys where at least one deficiency was cited, the mean 
number of deficiencies cited in 1994 was 8.3, but by 1997 the mean number had dropped to 6.2. 
Id. In addition, the number of surveys in which no deficiencies were cited increased sixty-nine 
percent between 1994 and1997. Id. at 538. 
  CMS’s 1998 Report identifies allegedly inaccurate citation rates in specific areas. For 
example, the Report alleges that surveyors do not accurately identify nutrition problems, an area 
which Abt also found problematic, but with respect to both over-citation (20 percent) and under-
citation (60 percent). See FINAL REPORT, supra note 66, at 123; CMS REPORT, supra note 82, at 
46. The Report notes that citations for certain federal requirements regarding nutrition had 
declined from fifteen percent in 1991 to less than five percent in 1996. CMS REPORT, supra note 
82, at 565. The Report dismisses the possibility that the declining citation rates reflects improving 
care, concluding that the survey and certification results are not valid. Id. at 46, 565. 
  CMS’s Report also concludes that the survey protocol does not accurately identify abuse 
of nursing home residents. Id. at 556. Once again, the Report identifies a decline in the rate of 
citations for abuse, but asserts that the survey results are not valid indicators of improving quality, 
stating that there is no independent evidence that the problem in fact has diminished. Id. at 578. 
  CMS’s Report also identified “considerable variation among States,” as measured by 
rates of deficiency citations, by the range (0 to 14 percent) of substandard quality of care 
determinations, by the pattern of immediate jeopardy findings and by the disparate range with 
which the states issued citations at levels that might trigger sanctions (from 22 to 100 percent of 
facilities in a given state). Id. at 541-543. The study also pointed out that, in 1998, five states 
cited no substandard quality care and another ten states cited virtually no substandard quality 
care. Id. at 42, 542. Again asserting that the citation patterns were not accurate. CMS stated that 
the results could not be ascribed “to true differences in nursing home quality” and characterized 
the “low rate” of substandard care citations as “implausible.” Id. at xi, 39-43. 
  CMS’s Report further asserts that “it is unclear, perhaps doubtful, that the degree of 
quality improvement observed” could have been responsible for the downward deficiency trend. 
Id. at 41, 540. Essentially, CMS concedes that they have no evidence explaining the results, that 
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consideration of the possibility that systemic problems with the survey also 
resulted in inappropriate false positive citations. Every subsequent government 
sponsored study of the survey protocol would utilize a similar approach, 
testing the validity of the system based on the incidence of false negative 
citations.86 
Nevertheless, despite focusing exclusively on whether the survey failed to 
identify care delivery problems, this study confirmed that the survey results—
both problem identification and classification of severity—were inaccurate and 
inconsistent.87 This conclusion was largely founded on three assumptions: (1) 
that the new survey should have produced more citations;88 (2) that, although 
nursing home quality had improved, the quality improvements did not explain 
the observed decrease in citation rates and severity;89 and, (3) that deficiency 
citations and classification made in simultaneous surveys conducted by CMS’ 
contract consultants—notably, using a different, specially designed protocol, 
not the protocol used by the state surveyors who conducted the certification 
survey—were the “gold standard” of accurate problem identification and 
classification.90 It bears emphasis that the study provides no empirical support 
for any of those assumptions. 
One year later, and almost ten years after the date on which the statute 
required the survey protocol be validated, the Office of Inspector General 
(OIG) of HHS reported: 
While it has now been more than a decade later since this legislation [OBRA 
’87] was passed, there has been… no methodical evaluation of whether the 
reforms it intended are actually working . . . .[T]he lack of a systematic review 
makes it difficult to determine if this major legislation has been successful in 
improving nursing home care.91 
Thus, OIG acknowledged, ten years after implementation, that OBRA ’87’s 
quality assessment and enforcement system had never been validated. Stated 
differently, fifteen years after the Tenth Circuit held in the Smith litigation that 
the Secretary had failed to fulfill her clear “duty to promulgate regulations 
which will enable her to be informed as to whether the nursing facilities 
 
the reasons for the improving survey results are not known, but that the results cannot be 
accurate. Id. at 538. 
 86. See infra pp. 23-26. 
 87. CMS REPORT, supra note 82, at x-xii, 39, 46, 538-40, 542, 549-54, 565-79. 
 88. Id. at x, 40, 41, 538-40. 
 89. Id. at 31, 46, 539-40, 565, 578. 
 90. Compare id. at 20, 43, with 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(g)(3)(A) (2012) (requiring federal 
surveyors assessing the validity of state survey results to utilize “the same survey protocols as the 
State is required to use.”). 
 91. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OEI-02-99-
00060, QUALITY OF CARE IN NURSING HOMES: AN OVERVIEW 4 (1999) [hereinafter OIG OEI-
02-99-00060]. 
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receiving federal Medicaid funds are actually providing high quality medical 
care.”92 The Secretary still had no basis to say whether the quality care for 
which the government was paying was, or was not, being delivered. 
The following year, the head of GAO’s health care unit testified before the 
Senate Special Committee on Aging regarding the effectiveness of the survey 
process.93 A colloquy between the committee chairman and GAO’s Dr. 
William Scanlon confirmed, yet again, that the quality assessments made using 
the survey protocol were not valid: 
The Chairman. Dr. Scanlon, do you think the quality of the surveys and the 
information in the OSCAR data base [in which nation-wide survey results are 
recorded] is reliable enough to make judgments about the level of quality 
provided in the nation’s nursing homes? 
Dr. Scanlon. Mr. Chairman, I am afraid it is not. I think that the variation that 
we see across states is troubling in the sense that we do not have confidence 
that the surveys are being administered consistently . . . . We have no 
confidence that this variation reflects the actual care that is being provided in 
homes across states. 
The Chairman. Do you think that the tools [CMS] and the states are using to 
assess nursing homes give us information about the quality of care provided in 
them and what do they tell us about the care provided? 
Dr. Scanlon. Mr. Chairman, I do agree with the industry that we are not 
measuring outcomes of care in the process of the survey . . . .94 
Thus, echoing what had been said in the original evaluation of the survey 
performed by Abt several years earlier, GAO concluded that survey results 
were not consistently applied, valid indicators of the quality of care actually 
provided. Moreover, GAO also concluded that the survey was not measuring 
the outcomes of resident care—the overarching goal, of OBRA ’87.95 To put it 
bluntly, not only were the survey results not valid, whatever the survey was 
assessing, it was not the performance measurement mandated by the OBRA 
’87.96 
 
 92. Estate of Smith v. Heckler, 747 F.2d. 583, 591 (10th Cir. 1984). 
 93. The Nursing Home Initiative: Two-Year Progress Report Hearing Before the Spec. 
Comm. on Aging, of the S. 106th Cong. III, 1 (2000) [hereinafter Scanlon Hearing]. 
 94. Id. at 165-66. 
 95. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 442.30(a)(5)(ii) (2014) (“The survey process uses resident 
outcomes as the primary means to establish the compliance status of facilities.”); U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-794T, NURSING HOME REFORM: CONTINUED ATTENTION IS 
NEEDED TO IMPROVE QUALITY OF CARE IN SMALL BUT SIGNIFICANT SHARES OF HOMES: 
HEARING BEFORE THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON AGING OF THE SENATE 1 (2007). 
 96. See Scanlon Hearing, supra note 93, at 166 (contrasting with what seemed to be CMS’s 
belief, Dr. Scanlon stated that GAO has “never indicated . . . that a majority or even somewhat 
more than a minority of homes is [sic] providing poor care”). 
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The frankness of GAO’s testimony may have been surprising, but the 
content should have sounded familiar. In addition to the findings made in the 
Abt Preliminary and Final Reports, the same points had been made repeatedly 
by those commenting on CMS’ proposed regulations containing the survey’s 
enforcement protocols. 
For example, during the rule-making process, a third-party study of the 
validity and effectiveness of the survey process was submitted to CMS. The 
study had been conducted by Jean Johnson-Pawlson, Ph.D., a highly regarded 
nurse clinician, nursing school professor, and consultant to the IOM. That 
study concluded that survey results were inaccurate, inconsistent, and not 
based on resident outcomes.97 
The Johnson-Pawlson study evaluated “the accuracy and consistency of 
surveyor performance during standard nursing home surveys” based on 
analysis of official deficiency reports from 420 nursing homes in twenty-one 
states.98 The Johnson-Pawlson Study found that: 
 45% of citations were not related to an actual or potential negative resident 
outcome[;] 
 42% of citations did not consider the seriousness of findings[;] 
 35% of citations did not consider how widespread (scope) the surveyor 
findings were in the facility[;] 
 36% of the citations lacked sufficient documentation to support the 
deficiency[; and] 
 26% of deficiencies cited were not supported by information detailed in the 
Long Term Care Survey Guidelines.99 
The data also indicated “considerable variation between states” and concluded 
that “the probability of these differences being due to chance is zero.”100 The 
Johnson-Pawlson Study concluded that to assess and enforce quality standards 
using CMS’s on defendants’ survey process was “a major flaw:” 
The magnitude of the potential inaccuracies is greater than what should be 
acceptable to consumers, providers and regulatory agencies. With 30% of 
citations potentially not meeting reasonable standards for determination of 
deficiencies, the current survey process may not be a valid measure of the 
extent to which facilities comply with federal requirements.101 
 
 97. Rulemaking Record for Survey, Certification, and Enforcement of Skilled Nursing 
Facilities and Nursing Facilities, 59 Fed. Reg. 56,116 (Nov. 10, 1994) at 5960, 5967 [hereinafter 
Rulemaking Record]. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 5960. See also Jean Johnson-Pawlson, Survey Inconsistencies Point To Need For 
Better Training, PROVIDER 60 (Jan 1993). 
 100. Rulemaking Record, supra note 97, at 5967-68. 
 101. Id. at 5970. 
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The reliability of the Johnson-Pawlson study was not questioned; instead, the 
OIG would soon rely on the study as the basis for its own critique of the survey 
methodology. 
Other national and state organizations also, conducted their own studies, 
reaching similar—and corroborating—results. The North Dakota Long-Term 
Care Association submitted “a statewide, six month independent study 
[concluding] that the current survey system is flawed.”102 The study was 
performed by former manager of the North Dakota Health Facility Survey 
Agency.103 The study evaluated deficiency citations for forty-three in-state 
nursing facilities.104 Among the study findings were the following: 
 Deficiency not Based on Negative outcomes 77/226 34% 
 Survey Procedures not Followed 57/226 25% 
 Deficiency Not Supported by Regulation 42/226 19% 
 Incorrect Regulation or Tag cited 21/226 9%105 
The Association’s report also concluded that “[t]he study indicated there is 
inconsistent application of federal laws by surveyors.”106 
A study conducted by the Kentucky Association of Health Care Facilities 
covered the twelve-month period from October 1990 through September 
1991.107 The study concluded: 
152 of 346 deficiencies [were] inappropriately cited under the OBRA survey 
process . . . . The summary found that deficiency content was incomplete and 
did not address the regulation. This problem was consistent throughout the 
review. Deficiencies which were found to be incomplete did not reflect that the 
steps as outlined in the training manuals etc., were followed in order to gather 
information prior to deficiency formulation.108 
Those findings corroborated what had been said previously and should have 
been surprising to no one. 
Although the problem of inconsistency between states was well known, the 
Kentucky study also identified problematic inconsistency in deficiency 
citations within the state as well as among nearby states.109 Tracking the 
deficiencies cited by the state surveyors revealed “no pattern of what type 
deficiencies are cited per region” among the four regions in the state.110 The 
Association noted that “[e]ach office seems to vary not only in which area of 
 
 102. Id. at 020134-48, 020134. 
 103. Id. at 020134. 
 104. Id. at 020141. 
 105. Rulemaking Record, supra note 97, at 020135. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 4110-13. 
 108. Id. at 4111. 
 109. Id. at 4111-12. 
 110. Rulemaking Record, supra note 97, at 4111. 
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the regulations the problem lies, but in the number of deficiencies being cited 
per region.”111 Moreover, “[i]n reviewing the deficiency profiles complied by 
[CMS’s], Region IV, there is much discrepancy among the eight [nearby] 
states, as to the [seriousness of] . . . deficiencies and the area of 
concentration.”112 
An analysis of survey results by the Georgia Nursing Home Association 
identified “about a 30% error rate.”113 Further, 
[t]he inconsistency in our State and the HCFA Region show a variance 
between states ranging from 4% to 54% for the same tag number. OSCAR 
reports [a computerized CMS database compiling survey results] show 
Georgia leading the nation in some program requirements and neighboring 
states near the bottom. Georgia also leads the nation in [the percentage of 
facilities cited at the most serious level of] deficiencies with 14% of the 
facilities receiving [such] citations while the national average is 6%.114 
Data submitted by the Louisiana Nursing Home Association likewise 
found intra-state variation in citations. For example, one regulatory violation 
was cited fourteen times in one of the seven regions in the state, whereas 
another region cited the same violation only once.115 
Whatever discount might arguably be necessary for comments offered by 
provider representatives, should have been offset because the concerns were 
corroborated by government officials directly responsible for the survey and 
certification program. For example, one of CMS’s Regional Offices was 
critical of the inconsistency of survey results in the same time frame. 
We have found the new long term survey protocols and guidelines do not 
provide a method for producing consistent survey decisions. Therefore, a State 
agency that cites more deficiencies will have more facilities facing alternate 
remedies than states who historically cite fewer deficiencies. [The agency’s] 
OSCAR report #19 [recording all deficiency citations] gives evidence of this 
by showing the number of deficiencies cited that are above or below two 
standard deviations of the national mean.116 
Echoing what Abt had said years earlier, the Regional Office continues, 
explaining that: 
CMS had not determined a precise definition of individual data tags in LTC 
regulations. In other words, when a LTC survey team collects evidence and 
determines there is a deficiency, it is not clear which data tag should be cited. 
 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 4112. 
 113. Id. at 6825. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Rulemaking Record, supra note 97, at 009174. 
 116. Id. at 032815 (Letter from the Associate Regional Administrator, Division of Health 
Standards and Quality, HCFA, Region X). 
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There are in fact, multiple, correct, data tags that can be cited for the same 
deficiency. The danger in this situation is obviously lack of surveyor 
consistency on a national scale. The application of sanctions will be 
inconsistent.117 
That the criticisms were made in writing by an Associate Regional 
Administrator of Division of Health Standards and Quality—the division of 
CMS responsible for day-to-day oversight of the survey—should have been 
unsettling. Individual states also objected that CMS did not have “consistently 
applied and meaningful standards.”118 Inconsistency, according to another 
state, was inevitable because “HCFA does not have a defined threshold for 
deficiencies and admits that deficiencies are based on surveyor judgment.”119 
States also criticized the proposed rule for ignoring resident outcomes.120 The 
State Medicaid Directors’ Association criticized the proposed rule for not 
“focus[ing] on resident outcomes.”121 
In May 1993, the OIG issued a report “State Progress in Carrying Out the 
Nursing Home Survey Reforms.”122 The OIG Report found that the nineteen 
states it had studied “are facing implementation problems that could jeopardize 
the intent of the nursing home reforms.”123 Relying on the Johnson-Pawlson 
Study, OIG warned: 
That study raises questions about the extent to which surveyors . . . have 
adjusted to the new outcome focus: 45 percent of the deficiency statements 
failed to consider either actual or potential negative outcomes. When these 
deficiencies related more to a home’s structure than to a resident’s outcome 
were excluded, 43 percent still failed to consider actual or potential 
outcome.124 
OIG’s fear that the intent of the nursing home reforms was in jeopardy would 
be confirmed within two months by “a report for which defendants contracted 
 
 117. Id. at 032817. 
 118. Id. at 032080 (citing Letter from Ga. Dep’t. of Human Resources). 
 119. Id. at 012159 (citing Letter from State of Me. Dep’t. of Human Services); see also id. at 
032082-83 (citing Letter from Ga. Dep’t. of Human Resources criticizing the enforcement 
regulations for “not giv[ing] notice of proscribed conduct” to the extent “that men of common 
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application”). 
 120. Id. at 013809 (citing Letter from Ark. Dep’t. of Human Services). 
 121. Id. at 013389. 
 122. Transcript of Administrative Record at 14685, Beverly Health and Rehabilitation-Spring 
Hill v. Health Care Fin. Admin., Dec. No. CR553 (Department Appeals Board, Civil Remedies 
Div. 1998), aff’d Dec. No. 1696 (Department Appeals Board, App. Div. 1999) [hereinafter 
Administrative Record]. 
 123. Id. at 14686; OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., OIG OEI 01-91-01580, STATE PROGRESS IN 
CARRYING OUT THE NURSING HOME SURVEY REFORMS at ii (1993) [hereinafter OIG OEI 01-91-
01580]. 
 124. Administrative Record, supra note 122, at 14689; OIG OEI 01-91-01580, supra note 
123, at 4. 
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on surveyor decision making and consistency as well as quality of care and 
quality of life measurement.”125 
Many of the problems identified by GAO, OIG and the commentary on the 
proposed enforcement rule also were largely confirmed by IOM in a 2001 
follow-up to the 1986 report that had been the foundation for OBRA ’87’s 
survey and enforcement legislation.126 The 2001 IOM report found that: 
  Several studies support the conclusion that the current survey process fails 
to identify important quality of care problems . . . . 
  [States] very substantially in their survey findings and no evidence 
suggests that this variation is a function of corresponding variation in the 
quality of care provided in the states.127 
In other words, whether the care provided by a nursing facility was found 
acceptable or unacceptable depended on where it was located, not on the actual 
quality of the care delivered. 
One year later, in 2002, CMS sought proposals to redesign the survey 
methodology. According to the Request for Proposals (RFP), CMS sought to 
redesign the survey process because: 
There is substantial State variation in nursing home deficiency rates, and scope 
and severity determinations for identified deficiencies. . . . Some of these 
differences might be accounted for by real quality differences among the 
nursing homes, but it is extremely unlikely that average differences in this 
great of magnitude for entire states can be explained in any significant degree 
by real quality of care differences. . . . [N]or can possible state differences in 
morbidity of nursing home populations’ account for these differences in 
citation patterns.128 
Further, according to CMS, “[t]he State-to-State variability in magnitude and 
pattern of various kinds of deficiency citation rates indicate that there is 
inconsistency in the survey process and raises doubts about the appropriateness 
in some deficiencies of either over or under identification of problems.”129 
Despite acknowledging that: (1) it was “extremely unlikely” that survey 
results reflected “real quality of care;” and (2) doubts about “the 
 
 125. Administrative Record, supra note 122, at 14684; OIG OEI 01-91-01580, supra note 
123, at 10. OIG appears to be referring to the Abt Associates’ preliminary reports discussed 
previously, which were presented to HCFA in July, 1993. Administrative Record, supra note 122, 
at 14303-14312; BRIEFING POINTS, supra note 68, at 1-9. 
 126. DIV. OF HEALTH CARE SERVS., INST. OF MED., IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF LONG-
TERM CARE 77-79, (Gooloo S. Wunderlich and Peter O. Kohler, eds., 2001). 
 127. Id. at 145, 151. 
 128. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., REQUEST FOR PROPOSAL, No. CMS-02-
017/JB, IMPROVING THE CONSISTENCY OF THE NURSING HOME SURVEY PROCESS 3-4 (2002) 
[hereinafter IMPROVING THE CONSISTENCY]. 
 129. Id. at 4, 10. 
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appropriateness,” i.e., accuracy of problem identification,130 CMS continued to 
utilize the survey results to determine facilities’ compliance with Medicare and 
Medicaid requirements and as a basis for imposing sanctions on facilities with 
no accommodation for the admitted concerns about the validity and accuracy 
of survey results.131 To the contrary, rather than acknowledge the potential 
impact on individual providers, CMS, as a practical matter, had insulated its 
failure to validate the survey protocol from challenge. CMS’ regulations 
prohibited facilities from challenging survey results or enforcement actions in 
appeals before Administrative Law Judges based on defects in the survey 
protocol from oversight.132 
It is fair to ask what the consequences might be for a private litigant who 
offered or relied on evidence acquired in violation of a statute or regulation or 
on evidence developed using non-standard protocols and methodologies.133 It 
 
 130. Id. at 3, 9. 
 131. US GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-03-561, NURSING HOME QUALITY: 
PREVALENCE OF SERIOUS PROBLEMS, WHILE DECLINING, REINFORCES IMPORTANCE OF 
ENHANCED OVERSIGHT 4-5 (2003) [hereinafter PREVALENCE OF SERIOUS PROBLEMS]. 
 132. 42 C.F.R. § 488.305(b) (2014) (“The State survey agency’s failure to follow the 
procedures set forth in this section [regarding the resident sample, surveying the quality of care, 
auditing assessments and care plans and assessing compliance with resident’s rights 
requirements] will not invalidate otherwise legitimate determinations that a facility’s deficiencies 
exist.”); 42 C.F.R. § 488.318 (Failure to “cite only valid deficiencies,” “conduct surveys in 
accordance with [regulations]” or use the forms, procedures, protocols, standards and methods 
specified by CMS “does not . . . . invalidate adequately documented deficiencies.”). Note, 
however, that a state may be denied federal funding if it conducts surveys in violation of such 
requirements 42 C.F.R. § 442.30(a)(1) (2014). Moreover, a provider agreement is not valid 
evidence of compliance if the survey is not performed in accordance with federal requirements. 
42 C.F.R. § 442.30(a)(5). 
 133. Cf, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594, 600 (1993) 
(Overarching test of admissibility of evidence under Rule 702 is “scientific validity–and thus the 
evidentiary relevance and reliability–of the principles that underlie a proposed submission.” Court 
must assess “whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically 
valid,” by considering, among other things “whether it can be (and has been) tested” empirically, 
“the known or potential rate of error . . . and the existence and maintenance of standards 
controlling the technique’s operation”); Schering Corp. v. Pfizer, 189 F.3d 218, 234 (2d Cir. 
1999) (noting that courts deciding whether to admit surveys in these circumstances should 
therefore examine their trustworthiness–and ultimately their weight, if admitted–both in terms of 
their methodological strengths and in terms of their proneness to faulty memory and perception.); 
Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Canarsie Kiddie Shop, Inc., 559 F. Supp. 1189, 1205 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (“The 
trustworthiness of surveys depend upon foundation evidence that (1) the “universe” was properly 
defined, (2) a representative sample the universe selected, (3) the questions to be asked of 
interviewees were framed in a clear, precise and non-leading manner, (4) sound interview 
procedures were followed by competent interviewers who had no knowledge of the litigation or 
the purpose for which the survey was conducted, (5) the data gathered was accurately reported, 
(6) the data was analyzed in accordance with accepted statistical principles and (7) objectivity of 
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is also fair to ask whether a private litigant asserting breach of contract would 
be permitted to prove such a claim using evidence developed in derogation of 
the breach assessment procedures required by the contract. 
Significantly in light of later events, CMS’ RFP discussed the agency’s 
view of the relative importance of consistent survey results and accurate survey 
results. Recognizing that survey results might be consistent but inaccurate, 
CMS made the seemingly obvious point that accurate survey results were the 
prime objective, and consistency, although important, was secondary: 
In general, we would expect a more consistent survey process to result in a 
more accurate survey process. However, the goal of improving the consistency 
of the survey process must not be attained at the expense of incurring a less 
accurate survey.134 
CMS’ actions would belie that assertion before the redesign of the survey 
protocol was complete. 
In the same year that the RFP was issued by CMS, GAO again confirmed 
that deficiency findings were unacceptably inconsistent. GAO also reiterated 
that such inconsistency could not be explained by differences in quality: 
[W]e have found considerable variation nationwide in the reporting of 
deficiencies . . . such differences in reporting make comparisons across states 
difficult since it cannot be determined whether observed differences are due to 
real variations in quality or to inconsistent application of standards.135 
Thus, fifteen years after OBRA ’87 was adopted and twelve years after the 
date by which the protocol was mandated to be tested and validated, it could 
not be said that protocol accurately assessed quality. In 2002, as in 1984, when 
the Tenth Circuit ordered the Secretary to promulgate an effective survey 
methodology, the Secretary still had no basis to conclude that the government 
was getting the quality care for which it was paying.136 
Also in 2002, another GAO study reported that, when federal surveyors 
conducted oversight surveys of state survey activities, the federal surveys 
found substantially more serious problems than were found by the state: 
[T]he subjective nature of the survey process means that the surveyors may 
apply standards unevenly. Indeed we previously have reported that during 
attempts to validate the findings of state surveyors, federal surveyors have 
 
the entire process was assured. Failure to satisfy one or more of these criteria may lead to 
exclusion of the survey”). 
 134. IMPROVING THE CONSISTENCY, supra note 128, at 4. 
 135. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-02-431R, NURSING HOMES: 
EXPENDITURES AND QUALITY 4 (2002) [hereinafter EXPENDITURES AND QUALITY]. 
 136. Estate of Smith v. Heckler, 747 F.2d 583, 591 (10th Cir. 1984); EXPENDITURES AND 
QUALITY, supra note 135, at 11-12. 
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found more than three times the number of serious care problems recorded by 
state surveyors.137 
GAO failed to note, however, that the federal surveyors are required by law: 
(1) to conduct the oversight survey in roughly the same time frame as the state 
survey; and (2) to use the same survey tools and methodologies as the state 
surveyors when conducting oversight surveys.138 
In other words, the federal surveyors and the state surveyors were 
mandated to conduct the nursing facility survey in precisely the same time 
frame and in the same way. It would be reasonable to expect, therefore, that the 
state survey and the federal survey would generate substantially similar, if not 
approximately the same, results. Nonetheless, the federal and the state 
surveyors obtained significantly different results despite using the same 
nursing facility survey protocol. The significance of the discordance between 
federal and state survey results ought not be minimized. Nor should it be 
overlooked, that GAO’s report—as do all other federal studies—presumes 
without either evidence or explanation that the federal surveyors’ results are 
superior to those reported by the same state surveyors. 
It is one thing to say that surveyors in different states and in different 
regions of the country produce inconsistent results using the same survey 
protocol. Although there is no evidence that explains inter-state differences, in 
theory, at least, such differences might be attributed to—though not excused 
by—differing standards of care, differences between facilities and resident 
populations, differences in resources, differences in time and circumstances of 
the survey, differences in public health status and other factors. 
The difference between state and federal results, however, cannot be 
explained by such factors. To the contrary, while inter-state comparisons are 
affected by numerous variables, many of the circumstances intuitively most 
likely to generate different results—inspection methodology, time, place, 
residents and caregivers—are held relatively constant when federal and state 
surveys are compared. It would seem that the federal-state differences are 
indicative of the dominant role of surveyor discretion compounded by the fact 
that, as the Abt Final Report concluded, the survey’s reliance on professional 
judgment is misplaced because nursing judgment is not adequate to make the 
complex decisions required by an outcome-based survey139 
 
 137. EXPENDITURES AND QUALITY, supra note 135, at 4. 
 138. 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(g)(3)(A) (2012). 
 139. See generally FINAL REPORT, supra note 66. 
  Moreover, it ought to be noted that there is no guarantee that the complex outcome 
analysis required by the survey process will be made by a nurse. The regulations require that the 
team that conducts a standard survey include one registered nurse. However, the remainder of the 
team is composed of interdisciplinary professionals. “Examples of professionals include 
physicians, physician assistants, nurse practitioners, physical, speech or occupational therapists, 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
116 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY [Vol. 8:89 
One year later, in 2003, another GAO report addressed the reliability of the 
nursing facility survey process. GAO also addressed actions proposed by CMS 
to improve the validity and reliability of the survey process: 
The agency [i.e., CMS] is committed to implementing only those portions of 
the new methodology that are proven to be significantly more effective than 
the current survey methodology.…We continue to believe that redesign of the 
survey methodology, underway since 1998, is necessary for CMS to fully 
respond to our past recommendation to improve the ability of surveys to 
effectively identify the existence and extent of deficiencies.140 
In short, GAO acknowledged that the redesign of the survey process has been 
underway for five years and, during that time that surveys have lacked the 
ability “to effectively identify the existence and extent of deficiencies.”141 
GAO treats the problem as a sterile administrative issue and ignores the 
real-world consequences. There is no sense of urgency in GAO’s assessment. 
More to the point, GAO fails to acknowledge that for thirteen years, consumers 
have been relying on the survey to assure their health, safety, and welfare. 
Likewise, care givers and providers—including individual nursing home 
administrators and nurses—have had their performance evaluated and their 
professional status determined based on a process repeatedly determined to be 
ineffective and inaccurate. In other words, the Secretary still does not have a 
means of determining whether federal dollars are paying for quality care. Yet, 
for those “real people” who are most dependent on the survey process, the 
issue is not economic, it is personal. 
GAO’s critique was far from singular. In 2003 OIG again reiterated: 
Our review of the survey process reveals that states differ in how they 
determine both the number and type of deficiencies. . . As a result, we 
conclude that nursing home survey results are not always consistent among 
states, therefore limiting the comparability of the data. Further, we cannot 
conclude whether trends in deficiencies are due to deteriorating care, variations 
in the survey process, and/or increased enforcement.142 
Remarkably, although OIG alluded to “deteriorating care,” the number of 
deficiency citations alleging poor care and citations at the highest severity 
levels had both been dropping for several years.143 There was, in fact, no 
 
registered professional nurses, dieticians, sanitarians, engineers, licensed practical nurses or social 
worker.” 42 C.F.R. § 488.314(a)(2) (2014). Ultimately, however, the state decides “what 
constitutes a professional subject to CMS’s approval.” 42 C.F.R. § 488.314(a)(3). CMS’s position 
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 140. PREVALENCE OF SERIOUS PROBLEMS, supra note 131, at 38 n.50, 39. 
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empirical evidence that care was “deteriorating.” To the contrary, the only 
basis for that assertion was speculation by CMS and other government 
agencies that their actions should have resulted in greater numbers of 
deficiencies.144 The possibility that efforts by regulators and the industry were 
producing positive results seems to have received little serious consideration. 
Like GAO, OIG made no comment on the significance of the problems with 
the survey to nursing facility residents, on the propriety or legitimacy of 
continuing to use such survey results to sanction providers or with respect to 
whether the survey results could be used to distinguish between “good” and 
“poor” facilities in the interim.145 
A couple of years later, in 2005, GAO again emphasized problems with the 
nursing facility nursing process and with the results of that process: 
Inconsistency in states’ surveys is demonstrated by. . . continued wide 
interstate variability in the proportion of homes found to have serious 
deficiencies. For example, in the most recent time period, one state found such 
deficiencies in about 6 percent of homes, whereas another state found them in 
about 54 percent of homes. . . . In addition, state surveyors continue to 
understate serious deficiencies as shown by the larger number of serious 
deficiencies identified in federal comparative surveys than in state surveys of 
the same home.146 
Once again, GAO failed to acknowledge that the state and federal surveyors 
were required to conduct surveys of the same facilities in the same timeframe 
and to use the same survey methodology and investigative protocol. 
The obvious question is: on what basis can one conclude that a protocol, 
which produces inaccurate results when utilized by trained professionals (i.e., 
state) surveyors, produces accurate results when utilized by similarly trained, 
professional federal surveyors to assess the quality of care delivered to the 
same patients by the same caregivers in approximately the same timeframe? 
Arguably, those variations are indications of profound systemic defects in the 
methodology used to assess quality by both state and federal surveyors, and not 
necessarily to differences between individual surveyors. GAO simply assumes, 
 
 144. Id. at 2-3. 
 145. Id. at 2. 
 146. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-117, NURSING HOMES: DESPITE 
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again without explanation, that results reported by the federal survey teams 
were accurate and that the states’ survey teams results were inaccurate. That 
may, or may not, be correct, but no evidence is proffered supporting the 
assumption. 
In 2005, GAO also emphasized the point that IOM had made in 1986 
regarding the importance of an accurate and reliable survey methodology: 
Given the pivotal role played by surveys in helping to ensure nursing homes 
residents receive high-quality care, the development and implementation of a 
more rigorous survey methodology is one of the most important contributions 
one can make to addressing oversight weaknesses.147 
The irony of GAO’s emphasis on the priority that ought to be given to assuring 
an accurate and reliable survey methodology is made poignant by the context 
in which the statement was made. 
Specifically, CMS had been engaged in redesign of the survey 
methodology to address the numerous criticisms made by government studies 
since at least 1998, more than ten years after OBRA ’87 had mandated use of a 
validated survey protocol. In 2005, however, CMS was not focused on fixing 
the survey process. Instead, the development of a valid survey protocol took a 
backseat to CMS’ initiative to roll out its Nursing Home Compare website. 
Despite the obvious need for the long overdue accurate and valid survey 
process—even ignoring that a valid survey protocol had been a statutory 
priority since 1987—no justification was ever offered by CMS for prioritizing 
the expenditure of time and capital on Nursing Home Compare. Indeed, CMS 
seemed to perceive no need to explain the source of its claimed authority to set 
priorities other than those dictated by Congress. 
The Nursing Home Compare website—and the Five Star Quality Rating 
System added to Nursing Home Compare in 2008—were designed to provide 
consumers with information to allow comparison of the relative merits of one 
nursing facility versus another. Both Nursing Home Compare and the Five Star 
Quality Rating System rely to a significant extent on the very survey results 
that GAO, OIG, and others had criticized as unreliable and inconsistent.148 
 
 147. Id. at 45. 
 148. See generally CHRISTIANNA WILLIAMS ET. AL., MEASURING NURSING HOME QUALITY 
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Thus, despite the long-standing recognition that the survey results were 
inaccurate and not clearly indicative of quality, CMS was engaged in a process 
to expand consumer reliance on survey results by individuals making critical 
decisions about where to obtain nursing facility care. 
In fact, the “Technical User’s Guide” for the Nursing Home Compare 
Five-Star Quality Rating System states that “[t]he survey rating is the most 
important dimension in determining the [facility’s] overall rating.”149 
According to the individuals who designed the Nursing Home Compare Five-
Star Quality Rating System, survey results were given disproportionally 
heavier weight in the Five-Star calculation because CMS wanted it that way: 
CMS wanted the health inspection domain to play a predominant role in 
determining the overall 5-star rating. The main reason for this is that, unlike 
the staffing and quality measure domains, which are based on data self-
reported by nursing homes, independent surveyors carry out the health 
inspection; thus, the data should be more objective and unbiased.150 
CMS, of course, knew that the data was neither “objective” nor “unbiased.” 
CMS had over ten years of government and government-sponsored reports to 
that effect beginning with the Preliminary Report issued by CMS’ contractor, 
Abt Associates in 1993.151 
To be clear, CMS insisted that survey results play a “predominant role” in 
the ratings published on Nursing Home Care, and it urged consumers to use 
Nursing Home Care in making care decisions despite certain knowledge that 
survey results were inaccurate and that variation in survey results could not be 
attributed to quality difference between facilities. Indeed, those inaccuracies 
were so deeply embedded in the survey system that CMS had been engaged in 
redesigning the survey protocol for approximately seven years.152 The 
problems with the survey system were serious enough that CMS had spent 
almost five million dollars on the redesign in only the first four years of the 
eight-year project.153 Moreover, rather than prioritize the development of a 
valid survey methodology, CMS insisted on moving forward and making the 
 
care in nursing home is problematic because the MDS was not designed as a quality measurement 
tool and does not reflect advances in clinical practice.” Id. at 43. 
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FIVE-STAR QUALITY RATING SYSTEM: TECHNICAL USER’S GUIDE 15 (2012). 
 150. See WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 148 at 4. 
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 153. Id. at 42. 
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Nursing Home Compare Website available to consumers despite GAO’s 
objection that the data utilized in the website was misleading and inaccurate.154 
In 2006, CMS announced an improved survey process called the Quality 
Indicator Survey, or “QIS.” CMS’ memorandum introducing the QIS stated: 
The CMS recognized the need to improve the consistency and effectiveness of 
the nursing home standard survey process and awarded a contract in 1998 to 
develop improvements to that process. . . . Improvements to the survey process 
are incorporated into fundamentally revised survey called the Quality Indicator 
Survey (QIS). The objectives of the QIS process include: Improve consistency 
and accuracy of quality of care and quality of life problem identification by 
using a more structured process. . . .155 
Thus, according to CMS, the new QIS would improve both consistency and 
accuracy of survey findings. 
According to CMS, one innovation in the QIS Survey was the 
identification of “a set of Quality of Care Indicators (QCIs) specific to each 
surveyed facility, which are compared to national norms and used to identify 
care areas for systematic investigations.”156 Testing of the new QIS process 
was still underway. Nonetheless, CMS stated that “[a]lthough we have not 
received final results from the evaluation of the QIS, the preliminary 
information received is very positive and indicates that it is time to 
strategically move forward with plans to implement the QIS process in a 
estimated eight to ten . . . selected States[]” in addition to the five states where 
QIS already had been implemented.157 
 
 154. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-03-187, NURSING HOMES: PUBLIC 
REPORTING OF QUALITY INDICATORS HAS MERIT, BUT NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION IS 
PREMATURE 4 (2002). Notably GAO’s objection to publication was not based on the well-
documented inaccuracies and inconsistency in the survey findings that CMS made a dominant 
factor in the analysis. Instead, GAO questioned the accuracy of the data used to determine another 
element in the calculation, the quality measures. Id. at 3. GAO also questioned whether the 
quality indicators had been appropriately validated. Id. at 21. 
 155. SURVEY & CERTIFICATION GROUP, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SRVS., S&C-07-
09, SOLICITATION OF STATE SURVEY AGENCY PARTICIPATION IN QUALITY INDICATOR SURVEY 
(QIS) IMPLEMENTATION 1-2 (2006). 
 156. Id. at 2. 
 157. Id. at 3. See also SURVEY & CERTIFICATION GROUP, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & 
MEDICAID SRVS., S&C-07-09, FYI - RELEASE OF BROCHURE DESCRIBING THE QUALITY 
INDICATOR SURVEY (QIS) DEMONSTRATION PROJECT 1 (2005) (“Initial testing of the QIS 
process has revealed it yields increased consistency and improved documentation of survey 
findings”). Note that CMS made no claim that initial testing reported improved accuracy, despite 
that “improve[d] . . . accuracy of quality of care and quality of life problem identification” was 
one of the prime objectives of the redesign of the survey process. Id. See also ABT ASSOCIATES & 
VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY, EVALUATION OF THE QUALITY INDICATOR SURVEY (QIS): FINAL 
REPORT at ii (2007) [hereinafter QIS EVALUATION REPORT] (“Improved accuracy of quality of 
care and quality of life problem identification is one of the objectives of the QIS”). 
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Although CMS characterized the QIS’s reliance on quality indicators as a 
“fundamentally revised survey,” the requirement to conduct the survey based 
on quality indicators was long-standing: IOM’s 1986 Report had recommended 
and OBRA ’87 required “a survey of the quality of care furnished, as measured 
by indicators of medical, nursing, and rehabilitative care, dietary and nutrition 
services, activities and social participation, and sanitation, infection control, 
and the physical environment.”158 OBRA ’87 incorporated the 
recommendations requiring “a survey of the quality of care furnished, as 
measured by indicators of Medicaid nursing and rehabilitative care . . . among 
others.”159 
It soon became apparent that CMS had acted and spoken too soon when 
promising improved accuracy and consistency. Significant problems with both 
accuracy and consistency were observed when the QIS process was fully 
tested. 
The Final Report of the “Evaluation of the Quality Indicator Survey (QIS)” 
(QIS Evaluation Report) was published in December 2007.160 The QIS 
Evaluation Report first described the purposes, objective, and methodology of 
the evaluation and then the results. 
According to the QIS Evaluation Report: 
The QIS is a revised long-term care survey process that was developed under 
the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) oversight through a 
multi-year contract. It represents an effort to standardize how the survey 
process measures nursing home compliance with federal standards and the 
interpretative guidelines that define those standards. The QIS demonstration 
represents the culmination of 15 years of CMS-sponsored research and 
development aimed at addressing criticisms of long-term care survey process 
raised by consumers, providers, the General Accounting Office, Congress, 
survey agencies, and CMS Central Office.161 
Among other things, “[i]mproved accuracy of quality of care and quality of life 
problem identification [was] one of the objectives of the QIS.”162 QIS was 
 
 158. Compare IOM REPORT, supra note 6, at 34 (“[t]he standard survey should rely on ‘key 
indicators’ of quality of resident life and care . . .”), and id. at 113-14 (“[t]he standard survey 
would be designed to use ‘key indicators’ of performance to identify facilities with poor resident 
outcomes that might have resulted from substandard nursing home performance[ ]”), and id. at 
116-17 (discussing use of key indicators), and id. at 378-88 (discussing key indicators and 
operational usage), with 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(g)(2)(A)(ii) (2012) (specifying content of standard 
survey and requiring use quality indictors), and 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(g)(2)(A)(ii) (2012) (also 
specifying content of standard survey and requiring use quality indictors). 
 159. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(g)(2)(A)(ii)(I). 
 160. See QIS EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 157. 
 161. Id. at i. 
 162. Id. at ii. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
122 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY [Vol. 8:89 
“expected to yield more valid inferences about the care provided to residents 
and systems of care.”163 
The QIS Evaluation Report assessed whether the QIS was more accurate 
than the standard survey by comparing facility quality measured by QIS with 
quality as measured by findings made using the traditional standard survey 
protocol.164 Evaluation researchers visited a sample of nursing facilities to 
collect data at the same time that the facility was undergoing a standard 
survey.165 The Evaluation researchers worked independently of the surveyors 
to collect data regarding seventy-five “Care Indicators” (CIs) addressing five 
quality domains: incontinence, nutrition, pressure ulcers, choice, and 
activities.166 In contrast, OBRA ’87 requires use of quality indicators assessing 
thirteen quality domains: “medical, nursing, and rehabilitative care, dietary and 
nutrition services, activities and social participation, and sanitation, infection 
control, and the physical environment,” as well as the accuracy of resident 
assessments, adequacy of care plans, and resident rights.167 After completion of 
data collection, the QIS Evaluation assessed: 
How well the QIS achieved its primary objective of improving the accuracy, 
consistency, and documentation of the nursing home survey process within 
existing survey resources. The CIs addressed [five] research questions: 
 Does the QIS lead to increased accuracy? . . . [The CIs] give measures of 
the quality of care provided by the nursing home that can be compared to 
surveyor findings to determine whether there is more agreement between 
surveyor findings and the quality indicators for QIS or Standard surveys. If 
the QIS is more accurate than the Standard survey, then we expect that there 
would be a higher level of agreement between QIS survey results and the 
quality indictors than for Standard surveys. 
 Does the QIS result in improved documentation of survey deficiencies? . . . 
We used content analysis to compare the quality of documentation . . . for a 
sample of CMS 2567 [Survey Report] Forms from QIS and Standard 
surveys, using a blind review process to measure whether the 
documentation supports the specific F-tag, scope and severity that was 
cited. 
 How does the time required to complete the QIS compare to the time 
required for the current survey? A key research question is whether the QIS 
requires more surveyor time than the current survey process. Using data 
from the CMS-670 form, we analyzed how QIS time compared to the time 
 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at iii. 
 165. Id. at ii, iv (explaining that the data was collected by reviewing the resident’s medical 
record, interviewing the resident and observing the resident in a variety of care-related activities). 
 166. Id. at ii. 
 167. 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(g)(2)(A)(ii)(I)-(II) (2012). 
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for the facility’s prior survey and to Standard surveys at similar 
facilities. . . . 
 How does the QIS impact the number and types of deficiencies that are 
cited? Analysis of survey deficiencies was used to examine the impact of 
the QIS on the number and scope/severity of deficiencies cited and also 
whether the QIS is associated with changes in the types of regulatory care 
issues that are cited. 
 Does the QIS improve surveyor efficiency? One of the objectives of the QIS 
is to improve the efficiency of surveyors . . . . We analyze the relationship 
between time and outcomes to measure whether the QIS is associated with 
changes in how well surveyor time is targeted to facilities with more quality 
problems. 
The answers to the research questions were not what CMS had seemed to 
promise when it asserted that “it [was] time to strategically move forward with 
plans to implement the QIS process.”168 
The QIS Evaluation Report concluded that, with respect to at least four of 
the five areas studied, the QIS was not an improvement over the standard 
survey.169 The QIS Evaluation Report summarized the evaluation’s 
conclusions separately for each of the five questions investigated: 
 Does the QIS lead to increased accuracy? [W]e did not find evidence that 
the QIS was more accurate than the Standard survey. . . . Ultimately, under 
both types of surveys, there appears to be a great deal of surveyor discretion 
and judgment that influences the decision to cite.170 
 
 168. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., SOLICITATION OF STATE SURVEY AGENCY 
PARTICIPATION IN QUALITY INDICATOR SURVEY (QIS) IMPLEMENTATION MEMORANDUM 3 
(Dec. 21, 2006) [hereinafter CMS QIS MEMORANDUM]. Although CMS asserted in the QIS 
Memorandum that preliminary results were “very positive,” that is hard to believe in light of the 
final results. Id. at 116. Moreover, as discussed earlier, the roll out of Nursing Home Compare 
demonstrates CMS’s willingness to take actions despite empirical evidence. 
 169. QIS EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 157, at 13-14 The conclusion section of the QIS 
Evaluation Report opens with the sentence: “The results of the evaluation were mixed and do not 
lead to firm conclusions about the effectiveness of the QIS.” That statement is belied by the 
Report’s actual answers to each of the questions and by the Report’s discussion of the 
implications of those answers. For example, with respect to the accuracy of the QIS compared to 
the standard survey, the QIS Evaluation Report is unequivocal: “We did not find evidence that the 
QIS is more accurate than the Standard Survey. . .”. 
 170. The specific findings and implications reported by the QIS Evaluation Report with 
respect to the accuracy of the QIS survey compared to the standard survey are excerpted below: 
Results 
“In general, we did not find any difference in accuracy for the QIS and Standard surveys. 
 The QIS and Standard survey samples were comparable with respect to overall 
quality and survey deficiencies cited. The two groups were also similar with 
respect to the frequency of Ftag citations of a scope beyond isolated . . . 
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 The overall failure rate on the CIs was high. The overall fail rate across all care 
areas was 44 percent for the Standard sample and 45 percent for the QIS 
sample. . . Across nursing homes, there was significant variability between CI fail 
rates for all care areas that provided the opportunity to judge how the two survey 
types discriminated quality with the Ftag citation system. 
 Overall, the relationship between quality and survey deficiencies was low. We 
found a positive but low correlation between the overall number of related Ftags 
and quality as measured by the CI fail rate for both Standard and QIS surveyed 
nursing homes. Neither QIS nor Standard surveys consistently documented that 
providers failed to implement many of the care indicators recommended in the 
investigative protocols. Some recommended quality measures were never or 
rarely documented by either survey team in an Ftag statement despite the fact that 
the majority of residents who were eligible for the care described in the guidelines 
were found in this evaluation to not receive that care. 
 There was no evidence of a stronger relationship between quality and deficiencies 
for QIS surveys. We found that there were no differences in the ability of the QIS 
and Standard surveys to detect quality problems . . . 
 Findings suggested that more survey deficiencies with scope greater than isolated 
could have been cited for both QIS and Standard surveys . . . Both types of 
surveys failed to detect more than isolated problems in many facilities. 
 There was no evidence that the QIS was more accurate with respect to survey 
deficiencies with scope greater than isolated. The CIs identified 29 occasions that 
would justify an Ftag greater than isolated across the Standard survey nursing 
homes and 31 opportunities for QIS nursing homes. The Standard Survey teams 
wrote greater than isolated Ftags in 15 out of these 29 opportunities (52 percent) 
vs. 11 out of the 31 opportunities (35 percent) for QIS surveys. 
 Both types of surveys failed to detect many residents with poor pressure ulcer and 
weight loss outcomes. . . . Both types of surveys failed to detect many residents 
who have poor pressure ulcer and weight loss outcomes and who also receive 
poor care according to multiple data sources.” 
Implications 
“We did not find evidence that the QIS is more accurate than the Standard survey, despite 
the fact that it has started the process of making the survey process more specific and 
focused with its Stage I protocols and automated data entry system. . .[W]e do not believe 
that a larger sample size would produce dramatically different results until further 
refinements are made in the basic concepts that underlie the QIS and which make it 
different from the Standard survey process . . . [W]e believe that the best explanation for 
the lack of differences between the two survey methods is related to two issues: 1) the 
specificity of the investigative guidelines and the critical element pathways, and 2) how 
feasible or “user friendly” the critical element pathways and interpretative guidelines are 
to implement. The various investigative documents used by both survey types vary in 
specificity such that there is much interpretation left to the discretionary judgment of 
surveyors. . .” 
Id. 
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 Does the QIS result in improved documentation of survey deficiencies? We 
found essentially no difference in documentation quality associated with the 
QIS . . . .171 
 How does the time required to complete the QIS compare to the time 
required for the current survey? We found that the QIS took considerably 
longer to complete than Standard surveys in two of the five demonstration 
states; two states consumed about the same amount of time and one state’s 
time was open to different interpretations.172 
 
 171. The specific findings and implications reported by the QIS Evaluation Report with 
respect to documentation of survey findings in QIS surveys compared to standard survey are 
excerpted below: 
Results 
“[O]verall there was essentially no evidence that the QIS leads to higher quality deficiency 
documentation. Nor was there any evidence that the QIS led to an overall increase in the citation 
of related Ftags: 
 Standard surveys were more likely to include both a deficiency statement and a 
related outcome. Overall, 33 percent of Standard survey Ftags reviewed [were] 
noted to include both a deficient statement and a related outcome, while 21 
percent of QIS Ftags reviewed met this standard. QIS survey process deficiencies 
, such as assessment (F272) and care planning (F279) deficiencies, were more 
frequently accompanied by their related outcome tags than were Standard survey 
deficiencies, but, for outcome deficiencies (e.g., pressure ulcer development, 
F314), Standard surveys were more frequently accompanied by related process 
deficiencies than were QIS outcome deficiencies. 
 QIS deficiencies tended to cite more types of evidence than Standard deficiencies. 
QIS Ftags reviewed cited as many or more types of evidence in general, for both 
process and outcome tags. 
 There was little difference with respect to the quantity of evidence 
cited. . . .California and Ohio QIS surveys referenced a higher number of data 
points than their Standard survey counterparts, while fewer data points were cited 
on Louisiana QIS surveys. 
 There was no evidence that the QIS was associated with citation of additional 
related Ftags. The review of [Critical Element] Pathways [guiding QIS 
surveyors’ reviews] did not reveal significant differences between the “related 
Ftags” cited on QIS vs. Standard surveys. . . 
Implications 
“While there is no concrete evidence that a reasonable level of inter-rater reliability was 
achieved prior to the review nor sustained during the review, the reviewers were 
experienced surveyors who participated in the development of the review protocol and 
guidance. The lack of a systematic difference[] in documentation quality may reflect the 
variable knowledge and skill of the surveyors under both the QIS and Standard survey, 
which likely influences both the decision to cite and the supporting documentation[.]” 
Id. 
 172. Id. at 13. The specific findings and implications reported by the QIS Evaluation 
Report with respect to the “major evaluation question” (because implementation of QIS must 
be resource neutral) of how the time to complete a QIS compares to the time required to 
complete the current survey are excerpted below: 
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 How does the QIS impact the number and types of deficiencies that are 
cited? The results of this evaluation clearly indicated that the QIS cites 




“Results varied across States. . . 
 For three states (California, Kansas, Ohio), the QIS took longer than the prior 
Standard survey at the same facilities – the pre-post differences were 
especially large in California and Kansas. . . 
 In Connecticut and Louisiana, the QIS was completed more quickly than the 
prior survey at the facility. . . 
 Exclusion of outliers does not change basic conclusions regarding QIS 
completion time. There were some QIS surveys that took an extraordinarily 
long time to complete, in some cases 200 or more hours. All but one of these 
surveys was in California and Kansas. The explanation for the high 
completion times varied. . . 
 The changes to the QIS implemented after the formative evaluation reduced 
QIS time requirements. The changes to the QIS implemented after the 
formative evaluation appeared to lead to modest reductions in the time 
required to complete QIS surveys.” 
Id. at 8–9. 
Implications 
“. . .[W]hile we do have conclusions about how long QIS surveys took to complete in 
each of the demonstration states, we do not offer conclusions about the time 
requirements of the QIS in other states. The likelihood is that there will be some 
states for which the QIS does not take any longer to complete than Standard surveys 
and others that struggle to implement the QIS and find that is does take longer.” 
Id. at 10. 
 173. Id. at 14. The specific findings and implications reported by the QIS Evaluation 
Report with respect to how the QIS impacted the numbers and types of deficiencies cited are 
excerpted below: 
“Results 
 The QIS was associated with an increase in the number of survey 
deficiencies: . . . [W]e estimate that the QIS was associated with 1.6 additional 
deficiencies in California (a 14 percent increase), 0.6 fewer deficiencies in 
Connecticut (a 9 percent decrease), 9.4 additional deficiencies in Kansas (a 99 
percent increase), 1.9 additional deficiencies in Louisiana (a 29 percent 
increase), and 2.4 additional deficiencies in Ohio (a 52 percent increase). 
 The QIS was associated with an increase in G-level deficiencies: We also 
examined the impact of the QIS on deficiencies cited at the G-level or above 
(G, H, I, J, K, L). The rate of G-level deficiencies was relatively small for both 
types of surveys, but the QIS was associated with large increases in Kansas, 
and Ohio and a large decline in Connecticut. There was a slight increase in 
California and relatively little change in Louisiana. 
 The QIS was associated with an increase in the regulatory care areas cited: 
One of the objectives of the QIS is to comprehensively review a wide range 
of regulatory care areas. In all five states, there were more regulatory care 
areas cited on QIS survey than on the prior survey at the facility. For all 
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 Does the QIS improve surveyor efficiency? Ohio was the only state for 
which the QIS was associated with an increase in surveyor efficiency.174 
To summarize, after almost ten years and millions of dollars had been invested 
in developing a new survey methodology, the QIS survey did not result in 
more accurate and valid survey determinations than the traditional survey. 
Further, the QIS did not improve the survey process in most other areas studied 
compared to the current standard survey. 
Remarkably, without acknowledging the overlap, the QIS Evaluation 
Report concluded that “the best explanation for the lack of differences [in 
accuracy and validity] between the two survey methods” lay in three 
problems—all of which Abt had identified as systemic defects in the original 
survey methodology in its 1996 Final Report.175 First, the “investigative 
 
regulatory care areas except for infection, facilities were more likely to 
receive a deficiency with the QIS survey than with their prior survey. For 
some regulatory care areas (resident rights, quality of life, dietary care, 
physician services, dental care, physical environment), the differences were 
substantial.” 
Id. at 11. 
Implications 
“. . .The analysis provides strong support for the hypothesis that the QIS leads to an 
increase in the number of survey deficiencies and an increase in the regulatory care 
areas that surveyors cite, supporting expectations about the QIS. These are an 
important finding given the studies by the General Accounting Office (GAO) and 
Office of the Inspector General (OIG) that have found that the Standard survey under 
reports deficiencies, harm-level deficiencies, quality of life, resident rights, and 
dental deficiencies. As a practical matter it would be difficult to implement any 
system that results in several fold increases in deficiencies, but this is not in general the 
case although the increase observed for Kansas QIS surveys may be a reason for 
concern. 
“A potential limitation of this analysis is that we are unable to control for surveyor 
quality. QIS surveyors were chosen to participate in the demonstration because of 
their experience. It may be that the QIS teams have higher citation rates than other 
survey teams, and that this may explain some of the increase in survey deficiencies 
that we observed for QIS surveys.” 
Id. at 12. 
 174. Id. at 14. The specific findings and implications reported by the QIS Evaluation Report 
with respect to whether the QIS improved surveyor efficiency compared to surveyor performance 
when conducting the standard survey are excerpted below: 
Results 
“. . .[T]he only state in which the QIS was associated with an increase in surveyor 
efficiency (as measured by the relationship between time and survey outcomes) was 
Ohio. . . The patterns that we observed on Ohio suggest that the QIS has the potential to 
improve surveyor targeting to facilities with the most quality problems, but the experience 
of the other states suggests that this need not be the case.” 
Id. at 13. 
 175. Id., at 5; see also FINAL REPORT., supra note 66, at 222–23. 
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guidelines and critical element pathways” intended to guide surveyor decision-
making were not sufficiently specific. Second, the guidelines and pathways 
were difficult to implement. Finally, and as a result “there is much 
interpretation left to the discretionary judgment of the surveyors.”176 The 
unvarnished truth was that, despite being repeatedly told that the survey 
guidelines lacked specificity, were difficult to apply and left complex outcome-
related decisions to the discretion and “professional judgment” of surveyors 
who lacked the ability to make such decisions, CMS officials later admitted 
that “surveyor guidelines on identifying deficiencies were not changed due to 
the implementation of the QIS.”177 
Although CMS relied on the Evaluation—albeit the Evaluation’s 
preliminary results—as a basis to move forward with implementation of QIS 
and away from the standard survey, the final QIS Evaluation Report actually 
rejected CMS’ approach. Rather than supporting a change in survey processes, 
the QIS Evaluation Report stated that its findings were “limited by a small 
sample size; thus the data we provide are best used for survey improvement 
purposes rather than to inform a decision about what type of survey process to 
use.”178 Just as it had ignored GAO and proceeded with Nursing Home 
Compare despite its reliance on flawed data, CMS proceeded to implement 
QIS notwithstanding the flaws identified in the QIS Evaluation Report. 
Despite having previously acknowledged the importance of accurate and 
consistent survey results and despite having assured that the QIS process 
would improve both consistency and accuracy, CMS reconsidered and 
retreated following publication of the QIS Evaluation Report in December 
2007. In 2008, CMS told GAO that: 
The QIS is not likely to increase the accuracy of deficiency identification. . . . 
But we do expect the QIS will increase the consistency of survey process both 
between States and within States. . . .179 
CMS’ underlying assumption, of course, was directly contrary to what CMS 
had previously said: that accuracy and consistency of survey results both were 
important, but accuracy was the overarching goal. Now, however, CMS 
claimed that improved consistency in survey results made the process 
significantly better even if there was no improvement in accuracy of results. 
 
 176. QIS EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 157, at v. 
 177. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-403R, NURSING HOME QUALITY: 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE QUALITY INDICATOR SURVEY 19 (2011) [hereinafter SURVEY 
IMPLEMENTATION]. 
 178. QIS EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 157, at v. 
 179. Letter from Vincent J. Vehtimiglia, Jr. to John Dicken (May 2, 2008), in U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-517, NURSING HOMES: FEDERAL MONITORING SURVEY 
DEMONSTRATE CONTINUED SERIOUS CARE PROBLEMS AND CMS OVERSIGHT WEAKNESSES 
(2011) [hereinafter OVERSIGHT WEAKNESSES]. 
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The following year GAO rejected CMS’ assumption that improving 
consistency without improving accuracy was an acceptable outcome. To the 
contrary, GAO reiterated that consistency might be important, but the QIS 
must be accurate: 
[T]he evaluation [of the QIS methodology] did not find that QIS methodology 
increased survey accuracy, noting that QIS and traditional survey samples 
were comparable in overall quality and in the frequency of standards cited for 
deficiencies with either a pattern or widespread scope. . . . While improving 
the consistency of the survey process is important, CMS must also focus on 
addressing the accuracy of QIS surveys.180 
GAO continued, emphasizing that: 
Survey methodology and guidance are integral to reliable nursing home 
surveys, and we found that weaknesses in these areas were linked to 
understatement . . . surveyors noted that surveys were too lengthy, complex, 
and subjective.181 
GAO might be entitled to claim credit for the insight if it were not for the fact 
that the exact same criticisms of the survey process had been leveled years 
prior to the adoption of OBRA ’87.182 
The OBRA ’87 mandate that surveys be conducted using a protocol that 
had been designed, tested, and validated prior to use was specifically directed 
to eliminate one of the major causes of inconsistent and inaccurate survey 
performance. Moreover, GAO exhibits the same myopia that increasingly 
affects those evaluating the survey process: GAO asserts that problems in the 
survey process result in understatement of quality problems, but ignores the 
possibility that systemic methodological defects also result in overstatement of 
deficiencies. An accurate survey process must both “identify deficiencies” and 
“[c]ite only valid deficiencies.”183 
Indeed, at the same time that GAO, OIG, and CMS’ consultants were 
focusing on under-citation, experience strongly suggested that the systemic 
issues were pervasive because false-positive citations were evident at the 
individual facility and state level. By law, nursing facilities issued deficiencies 
during a survey have a right to ask state survey agencies to reconsider such 
citations.184 The process, known as Informal Dispute Resolution (IDR) can 
take various forms. However, at the first level, the IDR is non-adversarial. 
Nevertheless, government studies of the results of the IDR process found that a 
 
 180. SURVEY IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 177, at 19. 
 181. Id. 
 182. See, Patricia A. Butler, Assuring the Quality of Care in Nursing Homes, 57 N. CAR. L. 
REV. 1318, 1327-337 (1979); Robert N. Brown, An Appraisal of the Nursing Home Enforcement 
Process, 17 ARIZ. L. REV. 304, 314-20, 324–38 (1975). 
 183. 42 C.F.R. § 488.318 (2014). 
 184. 42 C.F.R. § 488.331 (2014). 
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significant numbers of deficiency citations were either eliminated or modified 
at the first level review. 
Specifically, a 2009 GAO study found: 
16 IDRs were requested per 100 homes in fiscal year 2007, with this number 
ranging among states from 0 to 57 per 100 homes. For IDRs occurring in fiscal 
year 2007, 20 percent of disputed deficiencies were deleted and 7 percent were 
downgraded in scope or severity, but in 4 states at least 40 percent of disputed 
deficiencies were deleted through this process.185 
GAO’s findings were generally consistent with the findings of a 2005 analysis 
performed by the OIG.186 OIG found that forty-five percent of 1,211 disputed 
deficiencies issued in fourteen states during 2002 were changed as a result of 
IDR.187 Those changes included modification of the written citation (nineteen 
percent), deletion of the citation (nineteen percent), and decrease in scope or 
severity level (six percent).188 
Thus, if nursing facilities were willing to challenge the deficiencies issued 
in the survey process—and many facilities do not pursue such challenges for 
reasons unrelated to their perception of the validity of the citation—between 
twenty-five and forty percent of such deficiencies were either eliminated, 
modified or downgraded.189 It bears emphasis that deficiencies are eliminated 
or downgraded in significant numbers: (1) in a largely non-adversarial process; 
and (2) generally by the state survey agency that issued the citation in the first 
place. The obvious question is whether an average error rate of approximately 
twenty-five to forty percent would be acceptable—or permitted—in any other 
law enforcement environment. There is irony in that, despite findings 
 
 185. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-70, NURSING HOMES: ADDRESSING 
THE FACTORS UNDERLYING UNDERSTATEMENT OF SERIOUS CARE PROBLEMS REQUIRES 
SUSTAINED CMS & STATE COMMITMENT 42-43 (2009). 
 186. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OEI-06-02-
00750, INFORMAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION FOR NURSING FACILITIES (2005) [hereinafter 
INFORMAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION]. 
 187. Id. at 12. 
 188. Id. See Dana B. Mukamel et al., Nursing Homes Appeals of Deficiencies: The Informal 
Dispute Resolution Process 13 J. AM. MED. DIRS. ASSOC. 512, 514 (2012) (finding that in the 
period 2005-2008, 9.8 percent of all annual surveys and 9.1 percent of all complaints resulted in 
an IDR request but that there was large variability across states in the rate of which IDR was 
requested with 30 percent of surveys resulting in an IDR request in some states). 
CMS also has reported: “The quality and/or level of deficiency review may also affect the 
deficiencies cited by various States. . . . Some States have an intense deficiency review and 
carefully scrutinize each deficiency. The percentage of deficiencies rewritten as a result of the 
State survey agency review process ranged from 1 percent to 90 percent. Most States noted that 
this was a guess. Forty-four States reported the percentage of deficiencies that were withdrawn by 
their review mechanism in calendar year 1996. The percentages ranged from 1 percent to 25 
percent.” CMS REPORT, supra note 82, at 551-52. 
 189. INFORMAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION., supra note 186, at iii, 22. 
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suggesting that significant over-citation might be a problem as well as an 
understatement, GAO titled its report “Nursing Homes: Addressing the Factors 
Underlying Understatement of Serious Care Problems Requires Sustained 
CMS and State Commitment.” 
Some in Congress also began to notice. In 2010, a bill titled “Improving 
the Quality of Care in Nursing Home Act of 2010” was introduced in 
Congress. Although the bill was never adopted, the findings section of the 
proposed legislation is instructive: 
Sec 2 Findings: Since the enactment of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation 
Act of 1987, there has been little systematic evaluation or review of the 
effectiveness of the survey and certification system in measuring and 
improving the quality of care for nursing home residents as well as ensuring 
compliance with the requirements of participation by nursing homes 
participating in Medicare or Medicaid.190 
The bill’s assertions regarding the failure to evaluate the survey system—
despite OBRA ’87’s mandate to validate the protocol and for the Secretary and 
the states to implement programs to improve consistency—is, to say the least, 
ironic. 
That irony was made even more poignant by GAO’s April 2010 update191 
of its 2008 study, “Nursing Homes: Federal Monitoring Surveys Demonstrate 
Continued Understatement of Serious Care Problems and CMS Oversight 
Weaknesses.”192 Although the update, like the original study, assumes that 
differences in the results of state and federal surveys were attributable to poor 
performance by state surveyors and that understatement of deficiencies193 was 
the only problem with the survey process, the data on which the update relies 
confirms continued, profoundly serious and significant inconsistencies in 
survey results. Indeed, the data highlights that the inconsistencies were not 
merely between federal and state survey results, but also prevalent between 
states. Moreover, GAO states that the range of fluctuation in the results over 
several years makes “the longer-term trend unclear.”194 
For example, GAO’s 2010 update reported that, when federal government 
inspectors visited the same nursing facilities recently inspected by state 
inspectors and conducted a second “comparative” assessment of the quality of 
 
 190. Improving the Quality of Care in Nursing Homes Act of 2010, S. 3407, 111th Cong. § 
2(3) (2010). 
 191. See Letter from John E. Dicken, Director of Health Care, United States Gov’t 
Accountability Office, to Senators Herb Kohl and Charles E. Greasley, GAO-10-434R, Nursing 
Homes: Some Improvement Seen in Understatement of Serious Deficiencies, but Implications for 
the Longer-Term Trend Are Unclear (Apr. 28, 2010) [hereinafter “GAO Update”]. 
 192. See generally OVERSIGHT WEAKNESSES, supra note 179. 
 193. Defined by GAO as: (1) failure to cite problems; and (2) understatement of scope or 
severity. GAO Update, supra note 191, at 1. 
 194. Id. at 2. 
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care, the percentage differences in serious deficiency violations found by 
federal versus state inspectors nationally between 2002 and 2008 fluctuated 
“from as low as 11.1 percent to as high as 17.5 percent . . .” with 12.3 percent 
of the state surveys failing to cite at least one serious deficiency identified by 
the federal comparative survey.195 Moreover, differences with respect to less 
serious deficiencies existed, on average, in about seventy percent of the federal 
surveys in the period.196 In 2008, however, differences in less serious 
deficiency citations were observed in 74.8 percent of the state inspections 
compared with the federal comparative survey.197 
A wide range of variation in the alleged under-citation rates between 
individual states also is evident in the data, for both serious and less serious 
deficiencies. The range of variation in the federal and state inspections with 
respect to serious deficiency citations between 2002-2008 was reported as 
running from a low of zero in six states (Oregon, Alaska, Idaho, North Dakota, 
Maine and Vermont) to highs of twenty-eight to thirty-five percent in three 
states (Missouri, South Carolina and South Dakota).198 Nineteen states failed to 
cite serious deficiencies allegedly identified by the federal surveyors in less 
than ten percent of the state surveys, while thirteen states failed to cite such 
deficiencies in twenty percent or more of the surveys.199 With respect to less 
serious deficiencies in the same period, the state inspections cited fewer such 
deficiencies, on the low end, in twenty percent of the surveys in West Virginia, 
38.5 percent of the surveys in Alaska, and 30.8 percent of the surveys in 
Wisconsin, to a high of 100 percent of the inspections conducted in Montana, 
South Dakota, and Utah.200 Twenty-one states cited fewer less serious 
deficiencies than the comparative federal survey in seventy-five or greater 
percent of their surveys.201 
 Discussing the comparability of federal and state survey results, GAO 
noted that: 
By statute, comparative [federal] surveys must be conducted within 2 months 
of the completion of the state survey. However, differences in timing, selection 
of residents for the survey sample, and staffing can make analysis of 
differences between the state and federal comparative surveys difficult. On the 
basis of our prior recommendations, CMS now calls for the length of time 
between the state and federal surveys to be between 10 and 30 working days 
and requires federal surveyors conducting a comparative survey to include at 
least half of the state survey’s sample of residents from that nursing home in 
 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. at 3. 
 197. Id. at 2. 
 198. GAO Update, supra note 190, at 10-11. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. at 14-15. 
 201. Id. 
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the comparative survey sample, making it easier to determine whether state 
surveyors missed a deficiency. Furthermore, federal comparative survey teams 
are expected to mimic the number of staff assigned to the state survey.202 
GAO did not mention, however, that federal and state surveyors receive the 
same training, that the state surveyors are equally qualified professionals, and 
that the same survey procedures, forms, and protocols used by the state 
surveyors must, by law, be used to conduct the federal comparative surveys.203 
It is, of course, possible that the variation in the state survey results and the 
results of federal comparative surveys exists despite that the federal and state 
surveyors have the same training and qualifications, survey the same facilities, 
conduct the survey within days of one another, assess the care provided by 
roughly the same care givers to roughly the same residents,204 and utilize the 
same survey procedures, forms, and protocols to conduct the survey due to 
failings on the part of state surveyors and that the federal surveyors are the so-
called “gold standard” of nursing facility survey performance. There is no 
evidence that is the case, however. Intuitively, one could justifiably wonder if 
the range of discrepancies between federal and state survey results suggests 
that it is the federal survey results that are problematic. Indeed, superficially, 
the state survey results seem to align with one another better than they do with 
the results of the federal comparative surveys. Alternatively, an objective 
observer might legitimately ask if the real cause of the variation is a systemic 
problem with the survey system’s assessment tools that assures that survey 
findings are not reproducible. 
In a February 2012 report, GAO again made several points regarding the 
implementation of the QIS. GAO noted that CMS had developed the QIS to 
address weaknesses—including problems with accurate assessment of quality–
in the traditional survey: 
According to CMS, the QIS was developed to help the agency meet several 
objectives, including improving surveyors’ documentation of quality concerns; 
improving the efficiency of the survey process by focusing resources on 
facilities, and on areas within facilities, with the greatest quality concerns; and 
improving the accuracy and consistency with which surveyors identify 
deficiencies.205 
 
 202. Id. at 4. 
 203. 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(g)(2)(D) (2012). 
 204. Average length of stay for short-term residents (approximately fifty percent of residents) 
is approximately 23 days, for current residents, approximately 835 days, and for discharged 
residents approximately 270 days. The National Nursing Home Survey: 2004 Overview, 13 CTR. 
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, June 2009, at 4, available at www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/ 
series/sr_13/sr_13_167.pdf. 
 205. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-214, NURSING HOME QUALITY: CMS 
SHOULD IMPROVE EFFORTS TO MONITOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE QUALITY INDICATOR 
SURVEY 2 (2012) [hereinafter QUALITY INDICATOR SURVEY]. 
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GAO then reviewed the results of the 2007 QIS Evaluation concluding: 
In terms of whether the QIS led to improved accuracy or improved 
documentation of deficiencies, the report found that the QIS-based routine 
survey and the traditional survey approach generally led to comparable results. 
The researchers, therefore, concluded that the QIS did not significantly 
enhance or diminish surveyors’ ability to accurately identify or document 
deficiencies. Similarly, the study suggested that in general, surveyors using the 
QIS tool completed routine surveys as efficiently, as surveyors using the 
traditional survey methodology.206 
GAO also noted that in 2009 CMS had commissioned a third study to evaluate 
the QIS. That study, completed in 2011, “was intended to identify aspects of 
the QIS that could affect how consistently surveyors identify quality problems 
. . . .”207 According to GAO: 
The study found that various aspects of the QIS process, including the way 
resident interviews were conducted and the surveyor initiation process (in 
which surveyors identify additional problem areas, not identified by the QIS 
software, for further investigation during surveys), might affect the consistency 
with which surveyors identify quality problems during nursing home 
inspections.”208 
Stated more directly, the absence of specific guidelines governing surveyor 
performance required the exercise of surveyor discretion to make important 
decisions regarding how quality was assessed in the survey process—once 
again, precisely the same issues Abt had originally raised in its 1993 and 1996 
reports. 
GAO noted that CMS had begun to implement the QIS nationally 
following the 2007 QIS Evaluation Report. CMS “told [GAO that] they 
worked to improve aspects of the QIS process by taking steps to address the 
study’s findings and recommendations.”209 “CMS officials” likewise told GAO 
“that they intend to consider the recommendations made in [the third] study 
[completed in 2011] in their efforts to continue improving the QIS.”210 
The remainder of GAO’s report makes clear that CMS had not taken the 
steps necessary to keep those commitments. Noting that whether the QIS is 
meeting its objectives requires performance monitoring—“a key component of 
federal internal control standards”—GAO stated that CMS “acknowledged the 
need for certain performance measures—specifically with regard to examining 
the effect of the QIS on surveyor consistency—but noted that they did not have 
 
 206. Id. at 8. 
 207. Id. at 8-9. 
 208. Id. at 9. 
 209. Id. at 8. 
 210. QUALITY INDICATOR SURVEY, supra note 205, at 9. 
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performance goals or measure in place as of December 2011.”211 GAO 
summarized: 
[T]he agency has not established the means—such as performance goals and 
measures—that would allow for routine, ongoing monitoring of the extent to 
which the QIS is helping CMS improve the survey process as intended . . . . 
While studies commissioned at key points can be valuable, the information 
CMS would obtain on the QIS through routine monitoring is needed for this 
ongoing effort.212 
Even more remarkable, GAO found that CMS had no systemic process of 
assessing the accuracy and consistency of QIS results despite the requirements, 
included in the Medicare and Medicaid Acts since 1987, that: 
Each State and the Secretary shall implement programs to measure and reduce 
inconsistency in the application of survey results among surveyors.213 
 
 211. Id. at 9-10. In classic understatement, “performance goals and measures can affect 
CMS’s ability to effectively monitor the OIS.” Id. at 12. 
 212. Id. at 20-21. 
 213. 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3 (g)(2)(D) (2012). It bears some emphasis that when government 
studies refer to inconsistency of survey results, the reference is to state-to-state variation. There is 
no government study that examines whether inconsistency is a problem between surveys in the 
same state, i.e., intra-state inconsistency. One non-government study found substantial intra-state 
variations: 
“Variation also exists within states. For example, the state of Kansas is composed of 6 
survey regions. In 2001 facilities in the Northeast Region averaged 11.64 deficiencies, 
nearly three times as many as facilities in the West Region (3.69 deficiencies). . . 
Administrators and directors of nursing tended to think this heterogeneity reflected 
differences in the survey process; surveyors thought it reflected differences in facility 
characteristics.” 
Robert H. Lee et al., Reliability of the Nursing Home Survey Process: A Simultaneous Survey 
Approach, 46 GERONTOLOGIST 772, 772 (2006). The same study also reported substantial 
differences between two different survey teams: looking at the same evidence: 
“The variability interpretation notes that the two survey teams often reached different 
conclusions about whether a deficiency existed, what regulation had been breached, the 
scope of the deficiency, or the severity of the deficiency. These differences, furthermore, 
might well have consequences. The penalties imposed by the survey agency, the career 
prospects of facility managers, and the response of consumers are likely to be different for 
a nursing home that gets 7 D deficiencies than for a nursing home that gets 12 D 
deficiencies and 1 G. 
  “The same process can draw no deficiencies from one survey team and multiple 
deficiencies from another. As a result, nursing home administrators and directors of 
nursing cannot be confident that a good survey means that a process works 
well. . .Improvement efforts are inhibited by a survey process that falls short of 
systematic, replaceable data gathering and analysis. 
  “The variability of the survey also reduces its value to regulator and policy 
makers. . . The many disagreements of these two teams about whether a regulation has 
been breached, which regulation had been breached, and how serious the breach was 
cannot make federal or state officials comfortable. 
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In a March 2012 report, GAO again reiterated that there was no significant 
difference between the results of the QIS process and the standard survey 
originally adopted in the early 1990s to implement OBRA ’87.214 According to 
GAO, following introduction of QIS in some states, CMS considered whether 
to differentiate in its Nursing Home Compare Five-Star Quality Rating System 
calculation between nursing facilities surveyed by QIS and those inspected 
using the traditional methodology.215 CMS decided to make no distinction 
because: 
CMS examined whether the health inspection rating of facilities that were 
inspected using the quality indicator survey differed from those that were 
inspected with the traditional . . . survey. No significant difference was found 
between the two approaches in conducting the survey. . . .216 
GAO noted that CMS justified use of the survey data in the Five-Star 
Quality Rating calculation claiming, “the strengths of the surveys are that they 
are conducted by trained individuals and follow national standards.”217 Of 
course, years of GAO studies demonstrate that, training and national standards 
notwithstanding, twenty-five years after the adoption of OBRA ’87 and the 
mandate that the survey protocol was to be evidence-based, accurate and 
reliable, those goals remain aspirational. 
IV.  BACK TO THE FUTURE AND AT THE END OF THE DAY 
A. Déjà Vu All Over Again 
History gives those who hope to see CMS develop a survey protocol that 
validly and accurately assesses quality little reason to be optimistic. The need 
to revamp the survey process so that it validly and accurately assesses quality 
of nursing facility care has been recognized for decades, long before OBRA 
’87, and efforts to develop such an assessment tool have failed repeatedly. For 
years, deep-seated political, methodological, philosophic, and other conflicts 
 
  This article suggests that surveyors need more specific criteria, in the form of 
decision-making algorithms, to reduce the influence of individual perceptions. These 
findings concur with other valuations of survey consistency (GAO, 2003b, Office of the 
Inspector General, 2003, 2004). 
Id. at 778. 
 214. QUALITY INDICATOR SURVEY, supra note 204, at 1; See generally U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-390, NURSING HOMES: CMS NEEDS MILESTONES & 
TIMELINES TO ENSURE GOALS FOR THE FIVE-STAR QUALITY RATING SYS. ARE MET (2012) 
[hereinafter CMS MILESTONES]. 
 215. QUALITY INDICATOR SURVEY, supra note 205, at 16. 
 216. CMS MILESTONES, supra note 214, at 16. 
 217. Id. at 6. (“The primary goal of the Five-Star System is to help consumers make informed 
decisions about their care by providing understandable and useful information on nursing home 
quality.”) 
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among those most directly affected have precluded development of an 
effective quality assessment tool.218 
Development of a valid and accurate survey protocol has been a “third 
rail,” so politically sensitive that it has been unapproachable and certainly 
untouchable. As a result, various interest groups tolerate a survey process that, 
almost all agree, is ineffective because reform is so unlikely that commitment 
of the required resources and political capital would be the paradigm of 
throwing good money after bad. In the meantime, CMS tinkers with the 
Nursing Home Compare Five-Star Quality Rating System, continuing to assert 
that the System relies on objective and valid survey data219 and announces 
initiatives to tie Medicare payment to quality of care,220 despite that it cannot 
effectively measure quality, at least in nursing facilities. 
To be sure, in the early years after the adoption of the Medicare and 
Medicaid Acts, there were serious obstacles impeding the design and 
development of an effective means of assessing and enforcing quality in 
nursing facilities.221 As a federal official directly involved in the effort 
explained around the time that OBRA ’87 was adopted: 
  During the early part of the decade, congressional hearings, research, and 
discussion contributed to a growing body of concern and knowledge about the 
nature and regulation of nursing homes. Concurrently, the Federal Government 
was attempting to develop new sets of regulations. Two particular efforts are 
worthy of note: the attempt in 1980 to issue regulations that contained new 
standards for facilities to meet and the attempt in 1982 to issue new 
enforcement regulations. 
  [A] detailed explanation of all of the provisions of these regulatory 
proposals is of little interest. The significance of these proposals is in their 
failure. They proved that the Federal Government, for a myriad of reasons, was 
unable to establish sufficient consensus to reregulate [sic] the nursing home 
industry. The various conflicting forces, including consumer, industry, and 
State government, made it, in effect, impossible for the Federal Government to 
establish a reasonable, respectable set of proposed regulations.222 
More bluntly, the needs of nursing facility residents took a backseat to CMS’ 
institutional political considerations and to the agency’s inability—or 
unwillingness—to lead from the front. 
 
 218. See Morford, supra note 8, at 129 -130. 
 219. See, e.g., Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Fact Sheet: Nursing Home Compare 
3.0: Revisions to the Nursing Home Compare 5-Star Rating System (Feb. 12, 2015). 
 220. See Sylvia Matthews Burwell, Progress Towards Better Care, Smarter Spending, 
Healthier People (Jan.26, 2015) http://www.hhs.gov/blog/2015/01/26/progress-towards-better-
care-smarter-spending-healthier-people.html. 
 221. See, e.g., Morford, supra note 8, at 129. 
 222. See Id. at 129 -130. 
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Some nursing facility residents, however, had grown tired of CMS playing 
political “rope-a-dope” with the survey process. Federal litigation challenging 
the legality of the nursing facility inspection process was instituted in the early 
1980s, ultimately leading to several court orders that CMS develop and 
implement a survey process that accurately assessed the quality of nursing 
facility care. 
In what might, in retrospect, be seen as a prequel to the last couple of 
decades, CMS repeatedly refused to comply with the court orders. Indeed, the 
agency’s persistent refusal to develop and implement a valid nursing facility 
quality assessment tool led to the Secretary of HHS being held in contempt of 
court.223 The case is a cautionary tale for anyone who hopes that CMS will 
voluntarily fulfill its obligations to test and validate any time soon. 
Initially, the District Court dismissed the case, holding that it lacked 
authority to compel defendants to develop and implement a new inspection 
methodology.224 In 1984, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. 
Based upon the Court’s detailed review of the Medicaid Act as a whole, 
the Tenth Circuit held that the Act imposed a duty on the Secretary of HHS “to 
promulgate regulations which will enable her to be informed as to whether 
facilities receiving federal Medicaid funds are actually providing high quality 
medical care.”225 The Tenth Circuit further held that the duty to develop and 
utilize a survey system that validly assessed the actual quality of nursing home 
care was so clear and unequivocal that mandamus was the appropriate 
remedy.226 
In 1985, the District Court, on remand, ordered CMS to use the formal 
notice and comment rulemaking procedures provided by the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA) to adopt a survey process that assessed the quality of the 
care actually provided.227 On June 13, 1986, CMS promulgated the first of a 
series of “final” regulations.228 The new Patient Care and Services (PaCS) 
survey was described as outcome-oriented because compliance with federal 
standards was determined by the “facility’s success in providing . . . care.”229 
The Smith plaintiffs challenged the “final” survey rule, arguing that CMS 
had not complied with the Tenth Circuit’s mandate or with the District Court’s 
 
 223. See Quality of Long-Term Care: Hearing on S. 1108 Before the Senate Subcomm. on 
Health of the Comm. on Finance, 100th Cong. 51, 52 (1987) [hereinafter Hearing on S. 1108]; 
see also Estate of Smith v. Heckler, 557 F. Supp. 289 (D. Colo. 1983), rev’d, 747 F.2d 583, 591 
(10th Cir. 1984), on remand 622 F. Supp. 403 (D. Colo. 1987). 
 224. Heckler, 557 F. Supp. at 299. 
 225. Heckler, 747 F. 2d at 591. 
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 227. Heckler, 622 F.Supp. at 412. 
 228. See 51 Fed. Reg. 21,550 (June 13, 1986). 
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order to publish a valid survey protocol in binding regulations.230 Because the 
regulations did not include “the guidelines and forms which constitute the 
[survey] system,” or the “details of the [survey] methodology,” the District 
Court agreed and held that defendants had not complied, substantively or 
procedurally, with the Tenth Circuit’s mandate.231 The Court held that the 
Secretary’s refusal to be bound by specific, defined survey procedures, 
guidelines and forms was a dereliction of the duty imposed by the Medicaid 
Act.232 
The District Court further found: 
There is no legislative definition of ‘quality health care,’ and there can be 
none. It is something which emanates from the process of regulation. The 
methodology prescribed is the vehicle by which the Secretary will become 
‘informed as to whether the nursing facilities are actually providing high 
quality medical care.’ Thus, the method is the medium both for defining the 
expected level of care and for determining performance . . . . 
The Secretary needs to adequately define and guide the state surveyors’ 
functions to ensure that there is uniformity in evaluating the delivery of health 
care. Uniform guidelines are imperative for achieving that goal . . . . 
The failure of the Rule to include the specifics of the PaCS survey system also 
raises a procedural due process concern . . . . [A] facility adversely affected by 
findings of deficiency may successfully challenge enforcement because of a 
failure to give adequate notice of what is required or expected. There is merit 
in the argument that the failure to include sufficient detail in the regulation 
may preclude adequate enforcement under commonly accepted principles of 
fundamental fairness.233 
The court once again ordered CMS to engage in formal APA rulemaking.234 
Notably, the Tenth Circuit and the District Court were not alone in 
perceiving the need for binding survey regulations. During congressional 
hearings, in contrast to the Secretary’s long-standing opposition to 
promulgating the survey protocol as a formal rule,235 the IOM advised that, to 
promote consistency in survey results, the survey protocols and methodologies 
should be issued in regulations and consolidated in one location in the Code of 
Federal Regulations.236 
 
 230. See Smith v. Bowen, 656 F. Supp. 1093, 1094 (D. Colo. 1987). 
 231. Id. at 1099. 
 232. Id. at 1096. 
 233. Id. at 1097 (citations omitted). 
 234. Id. 
 235. See, e.g., Medicare & Medicaid Programs; Survey, Certification, and Enforcement of 
Skilled Nursing Facilities and Nursing Facilities, 59 Fed. Reg. at 56,120. 
 236. IOM REPORT, supra note 6, at 32, 111. See also Hearing on S. 1108, supra note 223, at 
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In July 1987, CMS published the second “final” rule in the series.237 The 
survey procedures, forms and guidelines were offered for comment in an 
appendix, but, despite the courts’ orders, still were not part of the binding, final 
rule and would not be published in the Code of Federal Regulations.238 Despite 
several court orders to the contrary, CMS continued to maintain that adoption 
of the forms, procedures and standards as a rule was undesirable because 
modifying them to reflect “changes and improvements” would be “slow and 
difficult.”239 
The court again disagreed. Reiterating the earlier ruling of the Tenth 
Circuit, and echoing IOM’s concern for consistency, the District Court again 
held: 
To become and remain informed, the Secretary must establish uniform 
standards for facility performance and a uniform methodology for evaluating 
that performance to ensure the delivery of high quality health care. Thus, the 
regulations required for these purposes must be prescriptive and legislative.240 
The District Court this time found the Secretary in contempt of court. The 
defendants were ordered to “take new action to promulgate a rule establishing 
standards of care and the methodology, forms and directions for the states’ 
survey certification process.”241 
In December 1987, seemingly despairing of CMS’ ability to reform the 
nursing home regulatory system and expressing skepticism about whether 
defendants would “eventually publish new regulations,” Congress adopted the 
Nursing Home Reform Act that was included in OBRA ’87.242 OBRA ’87 
enacted into substantive law many of IOM’s recommendations.243 
CMS treated the adoption of OBRA ’87 as an opportunity to avoid 
compliance with the Smith courts’ orders and moved the court for relief from 
the prior orders. The District Court disagreed, however, ruling that the orders 
requiring that the inspection procedures, forms, and methodology must be 
promulgated as binding regulations, “are not in any way inconsistent with the 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987[.]”244 According to the District 
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 240. Id. at 589. 
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Court, “[t]he passage of OBRA [’87] in no way modifies or preempts the 
Tenth Circuit’s decision.”245 
On June 17, 1988, almost one year after OBRA ’87 was adopted and four 
years after first being ordered to do so, defendants promulgated regulations 
containing nursing home survey forms, procedures and guidelines that had 
been in the development process prior to OBRA ’87.246 After fighting the need 
for prescriptive regulations, in the preamble, CMS explained that OBRA ’87 
had “ratif[ied] items included in [the] proposed regulations” so that any OBRA 
’87 related change in the survey process would be in the nature of “necessary 
refinements to the survey process forms and guidelines.”247 
Notwithstanding the statement that future developments would be “in the 
nature of necessary refinements,” CMS adopted new and different survey 
forms, protocols, procedures, and methodologies to implement OBRA ’87. 
Despite the Smith courts’ holdings, the OBRA ’87 survey forms, procedures, 
and protocols are not contained in the regulations, but, for the most part, are 
found in CMS’ State Operations Manual. 
The survey procedures, forms and methodologies adopted by defendants in 
June 1988 never have been repealed. To the contrary, the 1988 survey rules 
still are codified in the Code of Federal Regulations and are the only survey 
procedures, forms, and protocol promulgated through formal notice and 
comment rulemaking.248 Those regulations are not followed, however. Despite 
taking the position that OBRA ’87 had ratified those regulations and that the 
regulations conformed so closely to OBRA ’87 that only “refinements” would 
be necessary, CMS subsequently began to assert that the regulations were 
“obsoleted” by the passage of OBRA ’87. Moreover, CMS makes the assertion 
despite the fact that the Administrative Procedure Act expressly provides that 
the amendment, repeal, or modification of an existing rule requires formal 
notice and comment rulemaking by the agency proposing the change.249 
B. The Consequences of the Failure to “Test and Validate.” 
Almost twenty-five years after OBRA ’87 was adopted, the statutory 
mandate that quality be assessed: (1) based on resident outcomes; and (2) using 
a protocol that had been tested and validated prior to implementation remains 
to be realized. The government’s own reports and studies recognize that survey 
results remain inaccurate, invalid and inconsistent on the whole. 
The story, however, is not entirely one of failure. It is fair to say, that most 
people believe the substantive quality standards promulgated to implement 
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OBRA ’87 are both appropriate and, indeed, largely well done. Similarly, there 
appears to be widespread belief that the structure of the remedial process is 
likewise generally appropriate. Ultimately, the problem is that the detection 
methodology—the third leg of the stool of effective enforcement—is so 
problematic that it compromises the integrity, and undermines the utility, of the 
survey and enforcement process. 
The OIG, GAO, and other government studies and reports address the 
problems of the survey process using an antiseptic, theoretical, and philosophic 
public policy approach that ignores the real-world implications of CMS’ 
failures for nursing facility residents, providers, and caregivers. Instead, as 
illustrated by the government reports’ recent, near exclusive focus on 
understatement of deficiencies to the exclusion of possible overstatement, 
CMS seems driven by a political goal to appear tough on violators, rather than 
the desire to fix the systemic problems with the survey process and achieve 
across-the-board accuracy and consistency. That is not a value-neutral choice; 
to the contrary, it has consequences that undermine effective enforcement and 
facility-based performance improvement efforts. 
Individual residents and families seeking safe and effective nursing facility 
care for themselves or for loved ones have virtually nothing other than 
anecdotes and the survey results to guide their choice of a nursing facility. Yet, 
notwithstanding the uniform results of government studies responsible 
government officials continue to represent that those results are trustworthy 
and reliable because they are “data from onsite inspections conducted by 
trained, objective surveyors from state public health departments and CMS.”250 
Such statements may be politically expedient, but they are grossly misleading 
and a betrayal of the public trust. 
The deception foisted upon prospective nursing facility residents and their 
family members is exacerbated because the government—despite the findings 
of its own studies—publicly endorses the utility of such findings and 
repeatedly encourages consumers to rely on survey results when choosing 
among nursing facilities. Indeed, by incorporating and endorsing survey results 
as “the core of the Nursing Home Compare 5 Star rating system [sic],”251 the 
government affirmatively represents that such results are valid, accurate, and 
an appropriate basis on which individuals should decide which nursing 
facilities are most likely to provide safe and effective care. 
The plethora of government and government-sponsored studies 
demonstrating the unreliability and inconsistency of survey results suggests 
that, in a commercial context, similar representations would be an actionable, 
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ANNOUNCES NEW EXECUTIVE ACTIONS TO IMPROVE QUALITY OF CARE FOR MEDICARE 
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misleading, unfair, or deceptive trade practice. In addition, once admitted to a 
nursing facility, residents and their families justifiably view the survey process 
as providing assurance that quality of care will be maintained. That, too, is an 
illusion. The government’s studies and reports effectively acknowledge that 
the survey can provide no such assurance. 
The flaws in the survey process are equally problematic for care providers. 
To be effective, as IOM and many others recognize, a regulatory system must 
be based on valid, accurate assessment of quality. Indeed, IOM anticipated the 
current situation: a regulatory system that fails to prioritize those values lacks 
integrity, and ultimately will be disrespected and ignored, if not the subject of 
derision.252 Likewise, a regulatory system characterized by arbitrary and 
capricious results will be resented, as is the nursing facility survey in many 
quarters, and viewed to be something to be tolerated or avoided rather than a 
means to improve, or guarantee, performance.253 Moreover, such a regulatory 
system is a strong disincentive discouraging the professional administrators 
and caregivers needed to provide quality nursing facility services from entering 
or remaining in the field. 
Indeed, rather than encouraging pursuit of aspirational performance goals 
such as those embodied in the substantive performance standards imposed by 
OBRA ’87,254 the nursing facility survey system and regulatory system have 
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institutionalized a regulatory culture of blame that impedes development a 
culture of safety in nursing facilities.255 When a regulated entity believes that 
accurate assessment is not the primary goal of the regulatory system, or, at 
least, consistently likely, the regulatory system becomes an impediment to 
quality improvement. 
No regulatory system can be effective where as here, government 
regulators operate on a dual track system that effectively excuses the 
government’s failure to comply with statutory mandates but holds nursing 
facilities to a zero tolerance performance standard.256 The survey inspection 
process also has come to be held in disrespect because of the appearance, if not 
the reality, that federal regulators respond—as was the case with the Nursing 
Home Compare and QIS—to the opportunity to score political points even in 
the face of evidence that the survey process is seriously flawed.257 
The state regulators and inspectors who actually perform the bulk of 
nursing facility inspections are likewise placed in an impossible position. The 
disrespect in which the survey process is held and the perceived lack of 
integrity of the process create tension and adversity between the providers and 
the regulators who are the face of the process. That daily tension—along with 
the fact that the survey and enforcement system is, at bottom, punitive, rather 
than improvement oriented—makes it difficult, if not impossible, for providers 
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and regulators to cooperate in what should be a joint effort to pursue a shared 
goal of improving quality. When survey results are modified or citations 
eliminated at the rates previously discussed, state inspectors and supervisors, 
just as the providers, lose respect for the survey system, lack confidence in its 
integrity, and ultimately come to doubt whether what they do actually 
improves nursing facility performance. 
Conducting a nursing home or nursing facility survey is a difficult task in 
any circumstance. It is made even more difficult when the known defects in the 
protocol undermine the validity of the results and encourage disrespect for the 
system as well as for those who apply and enforce the regulations. In such 
circumstances, the effectiveness of the process is undermined by regulatory 
fatigue that causes inspectors increasingly to see themselves as performing an 
ultimately futile and ineffective task.258 It should surprise no one that there is a 
chronic shortage of surveyors. 
In an article published in 1988, a senior federal official responsible for 
oversight of the survey process stated his opinion that, as a result of OBRA 
’87, “the nursing home problem has now been fixed through legislation.”259 
With the benefit of the “retrospectoscope” it can confidently be said that the 
prediction was both premature and unjustifiably optimistic. 
The almost thirty-year old promise of OBRA ’87 has been broken because 
responsible federal officials, rather than implement the mandate of the statute, 
continued, as before adoption of OBRA ’87, to respond to the demands of a 
dysfunctional political system and to pursue their own agendas. Similarly, 
nursing home industry and resident advocates, as well as well-regarded social 
scientists, and public health policy commentators have accepted the failure to 
implement the statute’s mandates, rather than holding public officials 
accountable. Indeed, some well-regarded notable researchers have asserted, as 
have highly placed public officials, that the survey data are in fact accurate and 
sufficiently reliable to be used by consumers, in enforcement actions, public 
health research, analysis, and policy formulation.260 Likewise, industry and 
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resident advocates use survey data to support their own perspectives. So long 
as that situation continues, the interests of nursing facility residents will be, at 
least secondary, and it is unlikely that the goals set forth in IOM’s 1986 study 
and incorporated into OBRA ’87 ever will be achieved.261 
In 1984, the Tenth Circuit, in a lengthy opinion, had to parse numerous 
provisions of the Medicaid Act to find CMS’s duty to adopt and utilize a 
survey protocol that accurately assessed the quality of nursing facility care. In 
OBRA ’87, Congress made such painstaking piecework unnecessary. Congress 
wrote the agency’s duty into the statute in clear and unequivocal language and, 
lest there be any residual doubt, Congress summarized that obligation in a 
single, explicit provision that makes clear that the needs of nursing home 
residents, not administrative convenience or political expediency, ought to be 
the touchstone: 
It is the duty and the responsibility of the Secretary to assure that the 
requirements which govern the provision of care in skilled nursing facilities 
under this subchapter, and the enforcement of such requirements are adequate 
to protect the health, safety, welfare, and rights of the residents and to promote 
the effective and efficient use of public moneys.262 
Just as was the case with the Smith court’s orders, CMS seems determined to 
ignore the obligations created by the statute and to continue the pattern begun 
in the 1980s. Almost thirty years after OBRA ’87 was adopted, it is long past 
time for the Secretary to fulfill her duty. 
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